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Abstract: There has been a surge of recent antitrust cases
involving Internet-based industries around the world,
including in Latin America. These types of industries present
special challenges for authorities, as their analysis requires
an understanding of the fast-paced, innovative, and multi-
sided nature of these businesses. In this paper we present
methods and techniques for market definition and power
analysis which emphasize the need to focus on competitive
constraints rather than structural or functional
characteristics of products and services-a particularly
relevant issue in Internet-based industries. We next explore
whether the legal frameworks of Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico can accommodate this type of analyses. Our focus
then shifts to how competition takes place in Internet-based
industries; we describe how firms vie for consumer attention
and provide this attention to advertisers and developers
using the concept of "attention rivalry." Taking this
theoretical background into account, we pose the question of
whether the three largest Latin American economies have
the tools, legal ability, and expertise to undertake these types
of complex analyses. We use cases to illustrate where they
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have done so, and review the most relevant work they have
undertaken in Internet-based industries since 2000. In our
view, nothing prevents competition agencies in these
countries from conducting the correct economic analyses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust has expanded rapidly in Latin America over the last two
decades as a result of economic development in a number of
countries, and the effort to open up to competition former public
monopolies, such as telecom and electricity, and to modernize
regulatory institutions charged with overseeing them. These efforts
have been part of a push to change the drivers of economic growth
from those that emphasized the government's role in leading the
economy to one that considers market-based competition to be best in
spurring economic performance. By the end of 2012, seventeen of the
twenty Latin American countries had competition laws and
authorities in place to enforce them. The first country that adopted a
modern competition law was Chile in 1973, but since then the
remaining authorities have adopted new laws, with the Dominican
Republic being the most recent one in 2008. Tellingly, the current
head of the International Competition Network is the President of the
Mexican Federal Competition Commission.
As with many countries, the practice of competition law
enforcement is a work in progress in Latin American countries.
Competition authorities and courts are developing best practices often
by adapting methods that have been refined in other jurisdictions to
their national contexts. The purpose of this paper is to gauge whether
there is room in the current legislations for following some of these
best practices for defining markets, and analyzing market power, in
merger and monopolization cases, and to highlight their importance
when studying Internet-based industries. Market definition and
market power are usually the foundations on which merger and
monopolization analyses are based. Getting this part of the analysis
correct is therefore essential.
Some of the most complex applications of antitrust analysis
concern Internet-based industries. These industries pose challenges to
the traditional analysis of market definition and market power in part
because they are highly dynamic and the boundaries between
products are typically fluid.' In Latin America, as in most other parts
1 Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of
Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANrITRUST L. J. 1(2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2o84355.
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of the world, Internet-based industries have become increasingly
important in the economies. Around twenty years after the birth of
commercial Internet the pace of change is accelerating as a result of
greater access to the Internet. A key contributor to this acceleration
has been the deployment of smart mobile devices and applications
that run on these devices, which are connected to the Internet.2 For
this reason, to illustrate best practices in a complex, fast changing and
innovative environment, this paper focuses on the analysis of market
definition and power in Internet-based industries for the three Latin
American economies that have already begun to review and
investigate these industries: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes methods and
techniques for market definition and market power analysis. The
section is meant to provide background on the type of analyses based
on international best practices that are currently being undertaken by
different authorities. It is based in part on guidelines the authors
developed for Mexico.3
The next section looks at the legal frameworks underlying relevant
market and market power determination in the three largest Latin
American countries. We also look at how relevant market guidelines
for each of these countries support or expand on the elements
included in the laws. There is a tendency particularly in less mature
agencies-not required by the law and unfounded in economic
principles-to use mechanical approaches to market definition and
market power. In this, Latin America is not unique, as actual and best
practices will sometimes deviate.
Section III then turns to market definition in Internet-based
industries. It focuses on market definition for a class of Internet-based
firms that we call "attention rivals". These firms vie for the time of
consumers and then direct some of that attention to advertisers. The
competitive constraints for attention rivals comes from other
attention rivals regardless of whether they are offering the same
product or service. That, in part, is the explanation for the fact that it
2 Growing arrays of other devices are also being connected to the Internet, such as
television sets, point-of-sale devices for card acceptance, and household appliances.
3 Federal Competition Commission of Mexico, Assessment ofMarket Power in
Competition Matters, (March 2011), available at
http://www.cfc.gob.mx/images/stories/Documentos/guias/ultdoctopodersustmercado.pdf
[hereinafter, Market Power Report]; Federal Competition Commission of Mexico,
Assessment of the Relevant Market in Competition Matters, (March 2011), available at
http://www.cfc.gob.mx/images/stories/Documentos/guias/doctoreferenciadefmercreleva
nt.pdf [hereinafter, Market Definition Report].
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is widely perceived that Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google are
each other's most significant rivals even though each specializes in
very different products and services. The section concludes with a
discussion of the European Commission's decision approving
Microsoft's acquisition of Skype-an example that used most of the
principles we outline throughout this paper.
Section IV poses the question as to whether Latin America's
antitrust authorities in its three largest economies have the technical
know-how, experience, and the operate under a sufficiently flexible
legal framework-which we review in detail in section II-to apply
best practices and undertake complex analyses in internet-based
industries. In this section we begin by addressing the issue of
experience in undertaking complex analyses by presenting examples
of casework, unrelated to Internet-based industries, for each country
where authorities have used some of the principles we outlined in
section II. We then summarize the types of Internet-based cases that
have historically come up in these jurisdictions since 2000. Although
the degree of complexity of these cases has not yet required the tools
and analyses we discuss here, in our opinion, there is a good
possibility that authorities will be in a position to apply these tools to
future Internet-related cases.
II. BEST PRACTICES FOR MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET POWER
The purpose of market definition is to identify the competitive
constraints on the supplier of the product under consideration - the
market forces that reduce the profitability of raising prices above
competitive levels or lowering quality. If the buyers of a particular
product from firm A can realistically only turn to firm B if firm A
raises its prices substantially, for instance, then B provides the only
competitive constraint on A. In general, the strength of the
competitive constraints determines whether practices engaged in by
the supplier of the product under consideration, or the combination of
two or more suppliers, could harm competition and consumers. For
example, it is unlikely that the merger of two firms could harm
competition if consumers could turn to many alternative and
comparable suppliers. Those firms, once merged, would not be able to
raise prices because consumers would simply buy elsewhere.
Market definition is closely related to the assessment of market
power.4 Market power concerns the ability of a supplier of a product to
4 For further discussion, see Market Power Report.
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charge prices that are significantly higher than those that would occur
under perfect (i.e., very intense) competition. Most businesses have
some market power; business practices are anticompetitive only when
engaged in by those with substantial market power (with the
exception of hardcore cartel behavior, of course). A particular
business practice, such as entering into exclusive contracts, could
harm competition if the supplier has substantial market power but
could be benign if the supplier does not have such power. Likewise, a
merger of two firms could only result in higher prices if the
concentration results in the merged firm having significantly greater
market power than either firm had alone. Market definition is the first
step in assessing market power; it identifies the sources of competitive
constraints that determine the degree of power that a supplier (or a
combination of suppliers) likely has. The weaker the competitive
constraints a firm faces, the greater its market power.
Market definition is not, however, an end in itself. This analytical
device is useful only to the extent that it assists in assessing the
competitive constraints that are relevant for the matter under
consideration. In fact, the assessment of the relevant market could
lead to significant error if it resulted in ignoring competitive
constraints, as this could lead to the false conclusion that practices are
harmful to competition, or if it resulted in exaggerating competitive
constraints, as this could lead to the false conclusion that the practices
are lawful.
Several practices are advisable to minimize errors in market
definition. We list these as recommendations next.
A. Identifying Competitive Constraints
1. Always Come Back to Competitive Constraints
Since the ultimate purpose of the analysis of market definition and
power is to assess competitive constraints it is important that the
analysis of the relevant market and market power accurately reflect
these constraints. Therefore, best practice requires that each of these
competitive constraints-or lack thereof-are carefully considered in
the analysis.
There are several key competitive constraints that could limit the
ability of the supplier of the product at issue to make changes that are
adverse to the interest of consumers. Assessing whether a merger or
competitive conduct harms consumers often requires the balancing of
positive and negative effects, including price, quality, and the rate of
innovation. It is important to focus on "net" changes since is it
possible that price could increase but that consumers would be better
off because the quality of the product more than compensates for the
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increase in price; or that price could fall but not enough to
compensate for reductions in quality or other factors. In such an
assessment, key competitive factors include:
* Demand substitutability. Could consumers turn
to other products so that an adverse change by
the producer would result in consumers
reducing consumption of its product in favor of
other products?
* Switching costs. Can consumers readily switch
to an alternative product or do they incur costs
that would make them captive to the supplier at
issue?
* Multihoming. Do consumers have ready access
to several alternative versions of a product or
service so that they could easily switch from one
version if it imposed adverse conditions? The
concept of multihoming is particularly relevant
when consumers make sequential decisions to
"join" a service (e.g., a particular type of
payment card) and "use" the service (e.g., using
a type of card available to pay a merchant).
* Supply substitutability. Could other producers
of substitute products expand output to avail
themselves of increased demand by consumers
for alternatives to the product at issue?
* Entry. Could new firms enter in competition
with the supplier of the product at issue or
could existing firms switch production capacity
to supply substitute products?
* Innovation. Does incremental or drastic
innovation occur rapidly enough to either make
significant market power temporary or to force
the supplier at issue to both improve its product
and limit any adverse changes?
[Vol. 9:3536
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* Buyer power. Do buyers of the product at issue
have significant market power that could
prevent or limit the supplier of the product at
issue from making adverse changes?
* Complementary products. Does the supplier at
issue supply complementary products whose
demand, and profitability, would fall if it made
adverse changes? A special case of this involves
multi-sided platforms that serve as
intermediaries between multiple customer
groups. An adverse change to consumers on one
side would reduce the value received and the
price paid on the other side.
* Regulation. Do regulatory constraints limit the
ability of the supplier at issue to make adverse
changes? Alternatively do regulatory
constraints limit the ability of new firms to
enter the market or expand output?
Unfortunately, through statutes, case law, or actual practice by
enforcement agencies, some jurisdictions have adopted approaches
that limit the ability to consider some of these constraints in defining
the relevant market. Moving toward best practice requires the
consideration of these constraints as part of the assessment of market
power and whether the conduct at issue harms consumers. Errors
arise when the analysis ignores one or more of these constraints in the
market definition exercise and then refuses to consider them, or treats
them in passing, in the remainder of the analysis. Failure to properly
weigh these competitive constraints not only causes mistakes in
market definition; it encourages parties to a dispute to believe that
whoever wins the market definition battle will win the war and
thereby puts undue emphasis on market definition.
2. Focus on "Marginal" Consumers
The basic question that motivates the assessment of market power
is whether enough consumers would switch to substitute products in
response to a price increase by a supplier of the product under
consideration to make the price increase unprofitable. The consumers
who are most likely to switch are "marginal consumers" who were
already predisposed to consider other products because they view
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them as good substitutes. If there are enough of these consumers who
would switch then the price increase would not be profitable.
Identifying, measuring, and estimating the behavior of these marginal
consumers is critical to best practice market definition.
Fi ure 1
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Figure 1 above illustrates this point by considering the case where
every consumer buys at most one unit, a reasonable approximation for
some durable-goods markets (e.g., central air conditioners or washing
machines). Consumers are, in effect, listed on the demand schedule at
the point corresponding to the most they would be willing to pay for
the good. The diagram shows the case where a 5 percent price increase
results in a 20 percent decrease in the quantity demand, as a result of
there being a significant number of consumers at the margin between
wanting to buy the product in question rather than substitute
products. Once the price goes up, they switch.
A common mistake in the analysis of market definition and market
power is to focus on what the "typical" or "average" consumer would
do. The typical or average consumer may not in fact switch to
substitute products when a supplier increases its price. That is the
case shown in Figure 1. But it usually is not the average consumer who
determines whether a supplier can profit from a price increase. So
long as there are enough consumers "at the margin" between the
supplier's product and alternatives, the price increase cannot result in
greater profits. Suppose, for example, that a firm has variable cost per
unit of $5 and would sell loo units at a price of $10 for a profit, before
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fixed costs, of $500. (This may or may not be enough to cover fixed
costs, of course.) Suppose 80 percent of consumers would buy from
this supplier even with a small price increase of say $1, so that the
"typical" consumer will not switch in response to this price change.
But suppose that 20 percent are extremely price sensitive, so that if
this firm raised its price to $11, all would switch to another product.
That would reduce sales to 80 units and reduce profit before fixed
costs to $480, making the price increase unprofitable. For details of
how to analyze this in practice, see Section III below.s
When there is product differentiation, which is present in most
real-world markets, there may be discrete categories of consumers
that will switch from a product in question at various price points or
based on particular product attributes. Depending on what the price
is, and how much it is changing, many or a few consumers might
switch in response to a price change. Understanding how the market
is segmented is important in these cases. For example,
telecommunications cases have often brought up the question of
whether fixed and mobile phones are substitutes and whether price
changes would entice consumers to switch from one to the other.
Although, for some consumers, phones-whether fixed-line or
mobile-may represent a means of voice communication, in reality the
ability to communicate by voice "on the move" using the latter means
that for mobile phone consumers, a fixed-line phone is probably not a
good substitute even ignoring the other features that mobile phones
provide; the same of course is not true for fixed-line phones for which
a mobile phone may well be a good substitute. In both cases, it is the
number of consumers who would likely switch (the marginal
consumers) that will determine whether these products are, or are
not, good substitutes.
3. Use the Right Basis for Assessing Competitive Constraints
One of the consequences of a firm already having significant
market power is that the firm may have raised the price so much that
marginal consumers might have already switched to poor substitutes.
This is the well-known cellophane paradox based on a US case. 6 The
cellophane producer had raised prices so high that the marginal
consumers considered paper and other methods for covering food as
5 See also, Market Definition Report, Section 2.
6 George W. Stocking and Willard F. Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New
Competition, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Vol. 45, No. 1 (1955): 29-63, available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1811582.
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alternatives. The only reason these products were substitutes is
because the firm had exercised market power. The cellophane paradox
highlights the fact that the analysis of market definition and market
power needs to be careful about the vantage point from which it is
assessing market power.
In a monopolization matter, the relevant question ordinarily
concerns whether the party at issue in the case has significant market
power. For this purpose the question is whether it is currently able to
adopt pricing and related policies that differ significantly from what a
competitive firm would do. Thus, the benchmark for assessing
competitive constraints is the constraints that would limit a
competitive producer of the product. In particular, the relevant
demand-side substitutes are the ones that consumers would consider
if price were increased from the competitive level.
In a merger matter, by contrast, the relevant question concerns
whether the merging parties could, through their combination, make
things worse for consumers. In this case the relevant question is
whether, given the state of the industry today, competitive constraints
would limit the merging parties from raising prices. The fact that
either or both merging parties have significant market power does not
affect the analysis since for the purposes of a merger review
competition law usually accepts the market as it is now. It is only the
worsening of market conditions that causes antitrust concerns. So
here, the relevant demand-side substitutes are the ones that
consumers would consider if prices were increased from the current
level even if the current level is not competitive.
4. Recognize that No Real Competitive Market Looks Like
Textbook Competition
There are two features of real-world competitive markets that
competition analysis needs to account for.
First, almost all real-world markets involve products and services
that are differentiated from each other. Consumers have different
preferences for products and services and different needs depending
on their circumstances. People even of the same income like different
kinds of beer and different types of cars. There is therefore a market
opportunity to cater to these preferences and needs. Businesses
respond to these market opportunities by creating different types of
products and coming up with innovations that will appeal to
particular people. Businesses have strong incentives to exploit the
differences. There are usually limited profit opportunities in
producing the same product and service as everyone else. Therefore,
hardly anything is a perfect substitute for anything else. But many
[Vol. 9:3540
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products are imperfect substitutes and these, individually or
collectively, could constrain the ability of a firm to impose adverse
conditions on consumers.
Second, most seemingly competitive real-world industries do not,
and cannot, operate at the point where price equals marginal cost-the
equilibrium that maximizes welfare in the standard model of perfect
competition used by economists.7 The reason is that most firms incur
fixed costs including the fixed costs of establishing the business in the
first place. To recover these fixed costs, and therefore earn at least a
competitive return on their capital, they have to charge prices that are
in excess of marginal cost; that is they must have a positive operating
margin to cover their costs. Many firms in seemingly competitive
industries engage in value pricing-that is price discrimination-to
earn enough profit from various subsets of consumers to cover their
fixed costs of production.
5. Collect Evidence from Multiple Sources
In practice, competition policy analysis seldom has available
conclusive evidence. Most types of evidence are subject to frailties or
open to interpretation. By combining multiple sources of evidence,
however, it is possible to reach more robust conclusions. Key sources
of evidence include:
* Interchangeability information. Do consumers
switch between products based on common
knowledge? That is, are there documents,
studies or other evidence that would provide
information on the relative ease or difficulty of
adopting different technologies or switching to
alternative products? Is this a simple process or
does it require specialized knowledge or
learning? Do all consumers or only some
consumers do this? This may help focus the
analysis on the marginal consumer.
* Company records on competitors. Who do
company executives say they compete with?
Sales force documents, minutes of meetings
among senior management, securities filings,
7 Louis Kaplow and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, HARVARD LAW AND ECONOMICs DISCUSSION
PAPER NO. 575 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=961264.
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and public documents such as those provided to
investors may say. Especially when produced in
the normal course of business such evidence is
highly informative.
* Win-loss sales reports. What do company sales
records show about who they win sales from
and who they lose sales from most frequently
(particularly important for business to business,
or B2B). This is particularly strong evidence on
who effectively constrains a company in the
marketplace.
* Customer surveys. These are surveys whose
questionnaires have been designed to obtain an
insight into consumer reactions to price
increase. They ask consumers what products
they would switch to if prices went up. They
also allow to better focus on marginal vs.
average consumers.
* Statistical estimates. Conduct statistical
analysis of historical data on prices and
demand. Historical analysis can prove useful in
determining whether recent price information
is indeed the right basis for assessing
competitive constraints, nevertheless, even
what economists note as "data regularities" may
not necessarily be regular and additional
evidence is also beneficial.
* Natural experiments. Compare demand
patterns between different places with different
prices. These types of analyses are very useful
provided that allowances are made for variables
that can capture and isolate differences not
solely explained by price variations.
* Standard tests used to analyze mergers and
antitrust cases, with a particular focus on
price. Hypothetical monopolist test or small but
significant and non-transitory increase in price
[Vol. 9:3542
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(SSNIP) test. We would caution on the use of
these tests, however, as they tend to focus on
price competition only, and ignore other
dimensions of competition that are relevant to a
firm's business.
We now look at the underlying legal institutions as well as the case
law, which governs competition determinations in the three largest
Latin American economies. We seek to determine whether these best
practices are either explicitly mentioned or whether there are legal
impediments to their application.
III. CASE LAW AND DECISIONAL PRACTICE IN LATIN AMERICA
It is widely recognized among antitrust authorities and
practitioners that competition analysis needs to incorporate economic
thinking in decisions. Furthermore, there needs to be a flexible
approach in employing economic tools to diverse industries, and to
accommodate technological change. The recent Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Roundtable
discussions on Market Definition,' for example, note the importance
of recognizing the existence of multiple methods to arrive at an
answer for the main goal of market definition: to capture competitive
constraints faced by a firm as accurately as possible.
Over the last 25 years, many jurisdictions around the world have
made an effort to modernize their approach to antitrust. It began in
the US in the mid-1970s, when courts began incorporating economic
analysis into their decisions, and was continued and deepened as
authorities issued the 1982 merger guidelines. In Latin America, this
effort to make transparent its use of economic tools in antitrust
analysis is just underway, with the publication of guidelines starting in
the late 199os. It is not a simple undertaking.
Modernizing antitrust can be a more challenging exercise in
countries with civil law traditions that tend to have hierarchical laws
each with a precise interpretation mostly based on the letter of the law
and not always its intent. Changes to the interpretation of this vast
body of laws very often require a redrafting of the statutes by the
legislative branch. It is particularly challenging in countries whose
8 OECD Policy Roundtables, Market Definition, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND
ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, Competition Committee (2012), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Marketdefinition20l2.pdf.
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legal systems have tended to be particularly formal, or whose judges
are not entirely attuned to a subject so intricately related with
economics. Nevertheless, Latin America can look to other jurisdictions
for some direction. In the US and the EU there has been a push for
more economic thinking, particularly in merger cases.9 Both these
jurisdictions have followed up by modernizing their approaches to
market definition through guidelines, and/or notices and regulations
that have inserted economic thinking into decisions.
With rapid technological advances revolutionizing many
industries, it is critically important to modernize antitrust analysis.
Internet, mobile, and other technological changes have made
traditional formalistic methods obsolete, as these were designed for
industrial settings that were fundamentally different from the
dynamic and fluid industries that authorities are increasingly
addressing in mergers or conduct cases. There is a clear recognition of
this among most mature competition agencies around the world, as
emphasized in the OECD discussion paper cited above.
By reviewing the legal frameworks of Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico in this section, we make a case that there is nothing holding
back Latin American countries from following the modernization
efforts of other jurisdictions. In fact, some of these countries are
taking such steps already. In Section IV, we use some recent technical
decisions by the three authorities regarding mergers and
anticompetitive practices to illustrate the application of economic
tools to antitrust cases.
A. Competition Law Framework in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
1. Argentina
Argentina's enabling statute is its 1980 Law 22,262, which was
subsequently modified in 1999 with Law 25,156. The 1980 law was
largely based on Articles 85 and 86 (now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU)
of European Union's Treaty of Rome, thus prohibiting price fixing
agreements (cartels) and banning abuse of dominance (unilateral
practices).o Merger control was not introduced until 1999 with the
new law.
9 See The Commission of European Communities, "Case No IV/M.1524 - Airtours/First
Choice," (Sept. 1999), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/ml524_en.pdf.
o Inter-American Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Competition Law and Policy in Argentina: A Peer Review, OECD COUNTRY
STUDIES (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Argentina-
CompetitionLawPolicy.pdf.
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This law created the National Commission for the Defense of
Competition, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce and
International Economic Negotiations, which subsequently rendered a
final decision. The 1999 law created an autonomous National Tribunal
for the Defense of Competition with the authority to resolve cases and
impose remedies and fines; the Tribunal has not yet been created.
Meanwhile, all decisions by administrative authorities can be
challenged before courts in the federal system. Most appeals are heard
before the Federal Civil and Commercial Court of Appeals in Buenos
Aires, which is a quasi-specialized court, but not specialized in
competition matters. Its decisions can be further appealed to the
Supreme Court. Although the legal system does not create binding
precedent, cases decided by the courts, especially the Supreme Court,
do have practical effects on antitrust decisions.
2. Brazil
Brazil's first competition law was enacted in 1962 (Law 4137-62).
The law was subsequently reformed in 1994 (Law 8884/94) and more
recently in 2011 (Law 12,529/12).12 The new statute considers
violations of the law cartels (article 36, paragraph 3), and various
unilateral and concerted actions (also within the purview of article
36), noting more generally that any actions which limit or restrict
competition, control markets, arbitrarily increase profits, or constitute
an abuse dominant position are economic violations under the law.
The law prohibits mergers that eliminate competition in a substantial
portion of the relevant market or that enhance a position of
dominance in a relevant market. The biggest change in the new law
relates to merger review. The previous law had language that would
apparently require all agreements, not just mergers, to be reviewed;
this is clarified under the new law, which also streamlines review
11 The court has competency to resolve cases related in commercial matters and has decided
various competition cases. However, the Supreme Court has intervened in some so that it is
still unclear whether this court has indeed competence to review all competition-related
cases, hence the term quasi-specialized that we use here. See Jorge Otamendi, Tribunales
competentes en material de aplicaci6n de la ley de defense de la competencia, LA LEY 20o6-
C, 656-DERECHO COMERcIAL DoCIRINAS ESENCIALES, TOMO V, 505, available at
http://www.gbreuer.com.ar/admin/files/boletin-archivos/Tribunales%2ocompetentes.pdf.
12 Brazil National Law 12, 529/12 (2011), available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?84a467a9769494b68e.
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procedures and updates thresholds (Title VII, Chapter I, articles 88-
9 1) 3
In Brazil, the law that created the current competition authority,
the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), was
enacted before the 199os. The 1962 Law 4137/62 created CADE and
up until 2011, CADE shared competition enforcement responsibilities
with the Secretariat of Economic Law of the Ministry of Justice (SDE)
and the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring of the Ministry of
Finance (SEAE). The new law establishes that the Brazilian
Competition Defense System is made up of CADE and SEAE.14 It
transfers SDE's investigative and preliminary enforcement
responsibilities to a new CADE Superintendent, and terminates
SEAE's advisory role in conduct and merger investigations. The new
law grants CADE judicial powers and makes it a federal agency that
depends on the Ministry of Justice, but continues SEAE's competition
advocacy responsibilities.
An internal appeal exists before CADE's Plenary and is then
appealed before courts. Courts are a significant source of delay in
CADE's decisions. Federal courts of first instance hear appeals, with a
second appeal from regional courts of appeals and then the Supreme
Court of Justice. Cases involving claims of unconstitutionality may be
appealed beyond the Superior Court of Justice to the Supreme Federal
Court. Even though judges are not obligated to follow higher court
decisions, they have begun to do so. Generally, the merits of the
decisions are currently left to specialized tribunals such as CADE.
3. Mexico
Mexico's first prohibition of monopoly comes from its 1857
Constitution." With no legislation to make this prohibition effective,
competition policy did not really exist until 1993, when it was adopted
13 Description based on Inter-American Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Competition Law and Policy in Brazil: A Peer Review, OECD
COUNTRY STUDIES (2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/45154362.pdf.
14 Id., Article 3.
1s Constituci6n Politica de la Repzblica Mexicana de 1857(Constitution of the Republic of
Mexico of 1857), art. 28, available at
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/1eg/conshist/pdf/857.pdf. "There will be no
monopolies or state monopolies of any kind, nor prohibitions aimed at protection of
industry. Excepted only those relating to the coinage of money, to the privileges that, for a
limited time, the law grants to inventors or improvers for some improvement."
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as part of the conditions for the signing of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Federal Law for Economic
Competition (LFCE)," largely inspired by US statutes, has been
praised for its simplicity and breadth by the OECD in its 2004
review," but it has proven to be difficult to understand for courts and
practitioners, because of the widespread use of economic concepts
throughout it. The law divides conduct into two types: those that
ought to be reviewed under a per se standard, and those that ought to
be reviewed under a rule of reason standard. Cartels lie in the first
category ("absolute monopolistic practices"), and all other conduct
that must be analyzed under a rule of reason standard-including
unilateral conduct-under the second type ("relative monopolistic
practices"). Merger review was also included in the original law, with
thresholds pegged to minimum wages to ensure that these are in line
with current economic conditions.
The law created the Federal Competition Commission (CFC) as a
technically autonomous agency, dependent in its budget on the
Ministry of the Economy. It is responsible for enforcing the law and
has other attributions outside the LFCE and noted under laws in
regulated sectors, mainly overseeing competition conditions in
regulated sectors that, if absent, may trigger price regulation imposed
by sectoral regulators. It can also give binding opinions in certain
public tender processes and administrative bills, which can only be
overturned by a Presidential veto.
During its initial years the CFC's decisions were subjected to an
avalanche of appeals before the courts. Economic agents not only
appealed decisions, but also every single administrative act through
district judges, appellate tribunals, and the Supreme Court. In its
decisions, the courts have made clear that the use of economic
terminology in the law is constitutional. To strengthen the CFC, there
have been two reforms to the law, in 2006 and 2011, mostly granting
the CFC additional powers, streamlining its merger procedures,
allowing for a leniency program (to incentivize self-reporting of
violations), and increased fines for violations. Another round of
16 The enabling law, bylaws, internal code of rules as well as court jurisprudence legal
statute are available at Comisi6n Federal de Competencia M6xico, Compendio Normativo
en Materia de Competencia Econ6mica, (2012), available at
www.cfc.gob.mx/images/stories/Leyes/compendionormativo/2012/compendiocfc 2012
octubre.pdf.
17 Inter-American Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Competition Law and Policy in Mexico: An OECD Peer Review (2004),
available at http://www.oecd.org/mexico/3143o869.pdf.
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reforms are currently under discussion to increase the powers of the
CFC.
B. Market Definition and Market Power
1. Argentina
While the law makes no specific mention of relevant market
definition, Article 5 identifies three factors to be considered in
determining the existence of market power: the degree of substitution
of the product or service (including the possibility of substituting with
imports, the conditions for substitution and the time required to
substitute); legal barriers to access these substitute goods by
consumers or suppliers; and the ability of a seller to unilaterally
influence prices. These factors should be considered in both merger
and unilateral conduct cases. The guidelines issued for merger
analysis (Resolution 164/2001) describe relevant market and power
determinations. These are official guidelines, binding on the authority
in merger cases. While not required in unilateral conduct cases, the
guidelines are usually followed by agencies, especially when other
guidance does not exist.
Resolution 164/2001 notes that the product market includes those
goods and/or services that are substitutes based on characteristics,
prices, and consumption purpose. Substitutes are those goods that
capture the demand of a consumer, and should therefore be included
in the same market. While the guidelines include the SSNIP test as a
valid methodology for determining relevant market, it notes that the
test is not conclusive to relevant market determination. The guidelines
consider the possibility that price could be higher than marginal costs
due to high fixed or sunk costs and takes into account characteristics
other than price to determine demand substitution, such as additional
services supplied by the company. None of these statements would
contradict or negate the competitive constraints analysis that we
discussed previously.
2. Brazil
While the law makes no explicit mention of how to define relevant
markets, it states that dominance is presumed when a company or
group of companies wields more than 20% of a relevant market (but
grants discretion to CADE to modify this threshold for specific
sectors). Thus, market shares are a hard boundary in the analysis of
both mergers and unilateral conduct, making market definition a
critical step in the process.
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CADE has mentioned, but never formally adopted the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines issued by SDE and SEAE in 2001.18 The guidelines
mention elements for the definition of a relevant market-including
undertaking a hypothetical monopolist test-and the need to evaluate
the probability of exercising market power-with a safe harbor of up
to 20% market share and a measure of the participation of the four
largest firms (C4), below 75%, or up to a lo% market share and a C4,
above 75%. Thus, the guidelines posit a traditional or formalistic
merger analysis, which would require a clearly defined relevant
market where market shares could be determined, and an
identification of economic agents and their joint shares in the market
(at least the four largest). 9 Nonetheless, CADE, who as we mentioned
has not formally adopted these guidelines to date, has noted in its
resolutions the importance of considering competitive constraints,
noting that firms that are followed or observed by other suppliers and
by consumers in their negotiations to determine prices and establish
commercial conditions, must be included in the relevant market.2 0
3. Mexico
In Mexico, market definition is a legal prerequisite for a finding of
harm-in the case of abuse of dominance or monopolization claims
(relative monopolistic practices under Mexican law)-and a
requirement for a finding of potential harm-in the case of mergers,
the analysis of public tenders, and determinations of effective
competition conditions in regulated sectors.2 ' As such, market
definition and power determinations must reach hard boundaries,
including estimating or considering market shares before any decision
is taken requiring this analysis.
According to statute, a market definition analysis must examine
substitution possibilities, (article 12, paragraph I); transportation
costs for the relevant product, its inputs, complements, and
18 Joint Directive SEAE/SDE No. 50 (Aug. 1, 2001), available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/internacional/Horizontal Merger-Guidelines.pdf.
19 The guidelines also mention the "hypothetical monopolist test," also part of a traditional
or formalistic merger analysis.
20 See Resolution 15/98, available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/docs/pdf/ra-15-98.pdf.
21 See Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Roundtable
on Market Definition, OECD (2012), available at
http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP(2o12)1
3&doclanguage=en.
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substitutes to determine the relevant geographic market (article 12,
paragraph II); users' possibilities of switching to alternative product
or service offerings-to a large extent a re-statement of substitution
possibilities-(article 12, paragraph III); and barriers to entry or
expansion (article 12, paragraph IV). For market power determination
the law requires that the authority "consider" market shares and the
economic agent's ability to fix prices unilaterally (article 13, paragraph
I); barriers to entry (article 13, paragraph II); the existence and power
of rivals (article 13, paragraph III); access to inputs (article 13,
paragraph IV); recent behavior (article 13, V); and other criteria
established in the bylaws.
The statute, while imposing strict requirements on any analysis
(e.g. market share "consideration"), does not establish thresholds or
methodologies, noting only that there must be a finding of harm. In
mergers, harm is described as those mergers "whose objective or
effect is to reduce, harm or prevent competition and free market
access of products and services that are equal, similar or
substantially related . . ." these are prohibited. In conduct
investigations, harmful actions are those ". . . whose object or effect is
or may be to unduly displace other agents from the market,
substantially foreclose their access, or establish exclusive advantages
in favor of one or more persons . . ." Because the law is silent about
possible methodologies for relevant market and market power
determination, the authority has some flexibility to use new or
different analytical tools to support its conclusions and eventual
decisions.
An increased awareness of the need for methodological guidance
recently led the CFC to commission white papers on market definition
and market power. The reference documents are intended to be used
for any procedures that require this analysis, not just mergers. The
previous section draws largely from these two white papers.2
C. Summary
While all three authorities incorporate elements of a formalistic
approach in their legislations, including the need to calculate market
shares (Mexico), and even safe harbors (Brazil and Argentina), they
also require (Argentina) or suggest (Brazil) the use of the hypothetical
monopolist test, and mention minimum elements that need to be
accounted for in market definition analysis, such as substitution, and
in market power determination, for example barriers. We summarize
22 See Market Power Report and Market Definition Report.
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and compare the flexibility in each country's legal framework to
accommodate different technical elements in their analysis of markets
and power in the following table.
Table 1: Market Definition and Market Power Determination in Latin
America.
Argentina Brazil Mexico
Relevant market: definition in law or jurisprudence? ?
Product and geographic dimension
Hypothetical monopolist test (SSNIP)
Targeted customers/discrimination 927 28
Locatipon ofsupfiers / - x
23 Secretaria de la Competencia, la Desregulaci6n y la Defensa del Consumidor (Secretary
of Competition, Regulation, and Consumer Defense), Resolution 164/2001, available at
http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/70000-74999/703o2/norma.htm.
24 Joint Directive, SEAE/SDE No. 50 (2001) at 8, available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/internacional/Horizontal MergerGuidelines.pdf. Product and
geographic dimension of the relevant market are defined in Item 28.
25 Resolution 164/2001, available at
http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/70000-74999/7o302/norma.htm.
Note that this test is not conclusive.
26 Joint Directive, SEAE/SDE No. 50 (2001) at 8, available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/internacional/HorizontalMergerGuidelines.pdf. The SSNIP
test is defined in Item 30 of the Guidelines of Horizontal Mergers but is not used often in
the analysis of cases.
27 While not explicitly mentioned, Resolution 164/2001 does not prohibit it either.
28 It is not explicitly described in law, Guidelines or cases.
9 See Market Definition Report, which is a suggested set of best practices but non-binding
to the authority.
3o Resolution 164/2001, available at
http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/infoleginternet/anexos/70000-74999/70302/norma.htm. It is
important to analyze the producers' location for the determination of the relevant
geographic market.
31 Joint Directive, SEAE/SDE No. 50 (2001) at 9, available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/internacional/Horizontal Merger Guidelines.pdf. Item 32 of the
Guidelines for horizontal concentrations describes that the agency must consider suppliers'
location, but this is not always included in the analysis of all cases.
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Argentina Brazil Mexico
Location of consumers /32 /33
Supply-side substitution as
Market power: definition in law or jurisprudence?
Market participants/rapid entrants
Market shares /38
Market concentration /39 / /
Supply-side substitution / 40
Marginal consumers 4 9 /
32 Resolution 164/20ol requires evidence that consumers are able to move to other areas
due to changes in price in order to buy the product.
33 Joint Directive, SEAE/SDE No. 50 (2001) at 9, available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/internacional/HorizontalMergerGuidelines.pdf. Item 32 of the
Guidelines for horizontal concentrations notes that the agency must consider consumers'
location, but this is not always considered in every case.
34 Resolution 164/2001 can be interpreted as saying both that rapid entrants need to be
considered (a low barriers to entry argument) and that supply-side substitution ought to be
included as well, since the example it presents is that of paper whereby a company can
adjust its production technology to produce different grades of paper.
35 Joint Directive, SEAE/SDE No. 50/2001 at 9, available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/internacional/HorizontalMergerGuidelines.pdf. According to
Item 32 of the Guidelines for horizontal concentrations, the agency must consider time and
costs involved in producing substitute products, but this is not always included in all of the
cases analyzed.
36 By allowing for technical possibilities of substitution of a product or service within
paragraph I of article 12, the law is allowing for supply-side substitution within the relevant
market definition analysis. Federal Law of Economic Competition, Mexico.
37 Resolution 164/2001, available at
http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/70302/norma.htm.
38 Resolution 164/2001, subsection 11.3 (and is also applied where concentrations are
horizontal or vertical).
39 Resolution 164/2001, subsection 11.4 (and in several cases when the type of
concentration is horizontal or vertical).
40 Resolution 164/2001, subsection IV. Consider supply side substitution as an element for
the possibility of abusing market power.
41 Although not explicitly excluded, marginal consumers' considerations are not taken into
account neither in the Resolution 164/2ool nor in case decisions.
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Argentina Brazil Mexico
Non-price competition: innovation and product variety 4.
Buyer power
Entry (timely, likely, sufficient) /48 V49 150
Efficiencies
Competitive assessment: definition in law or ?52 53
42 Marginal consumers are not considered in law or in the Guidelines for Horizontal
Mergers. They are not considered either in the cases analyzed, but this type of analysis is
not prohibited.
43 Market Power Report at 13-14.
44 Resolution 164/2001 subsection III.b. Non-price competition, mainly innovation, is
considered as part of the unilateral effects to measure the competitive assessments, but is
not mentioned with regards to market power.
45 Market Power Report; Market Definition Report.
46 Is not explicitly defined in Resolution 168/20ol but an outline of this subject could be
seen in subsection VII, and in various cases vertical relations of parties to a concentration,
where upstream and downstream effects are analyzed and the agency has explores any
changes to buying power.
47 Market Power Report, 16-17.
48 Resolution 168/2001, Subsection IV.
49 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Item 45, available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/internacional/HorizontalMergerGuidelines.pdf.
5o Article 12 of rulings to the law (Federal Law of Economic Competition, Mexico) describes
different elements that can be considered barriers to entry, such as financial costs,
investment amounts and indivisibilities, legal barriers, advertising expenditures and legal
limitations, but does not explicitly describe timeliness, likeliness and sufficiency of entry.
s Resolution 168/2001, Subsection VI.
52 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Items 61-65, available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/internacional/Horizontal MergerGuidelines.pdf.
53 This is contained within the definition of relative monopolistic practices-conduct
analyzed by rule of reason (article io)-and of anticompetitive mergers (article 16). The
language for both note that in order to establish an infringement to the law it is necessary
to determine that their objective or effect is to unduly displace, substantially foreclose or
establish exclusive advantages, for conduct investigations; or to reduce, harm or impede
competition and free market access for anticompetitive mergers. Federal Law of Economic
Competition, Mexico.
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Argentina Brazil Mexico
jurisprudence?
Unilateral effects V 54  /
Coordinated effects /s55 / 956
Table 1 suggests a consensus about the goals and elements
required for market definition and determination of market power,
with other elements still to be defined as the case law and practice
evolve. There is sufficient latitude in the legal frameworks of these
three jurisdictions to determine competitive constraints. In our view,
nothing in the legal framework prevents competition agencies in these
countries from conducting the correct economic analysis.
Nonetheless, as the next section discusses, internet-based
industries exhibit traits that make economic analysis more complex
relative to other industries and which, if ignored, can lead to incorrect
conclusions. We discuss some of the principles that ought to be
considered in defining markets and analyzing market power for online
businesses, largely based on the idea that many of these firms are in
fact rivals for users' attention.5 7 To illustrate the importance of
competitive constraints in the analysis of markets and power in
internet-based industries we use the Microsoft/Skype decision, which
illustrates the types of questions that ought to be posed and answered
by an authority when investigating anticompetitive practices or
mergers in these industries-we do not, of course, mean to judge this
decision as a whole. A more recent case, which also undertook this
54 Resolution 164/2001. Unilateral effects are not explicitly stated as such, but the
Resolution states that a merger review must consider whether the company eliminated was
a vigorous and effective competitor.
55 Resolution 164/2001. Coordinated effects are not explicitly stated as such, but the
Resolution states that the characteristics of the remaining competitors in the relevant
market have to be considered, and if they tend to accept stability and behave as followers,
competitive conditions could be harmed.
56 Federal Law of Economic Competition, Mexico. This is still an open question. Article 17
of the law clearly foresees unilateral effects but adds that any act or attempt to exercise
monopolistic practices is evidence of an anticompetitive merger. This has currently been
interpreted as a possibility to review coordinated effects within a merger.
57 This section draws largely from David S. Evans, Attention Rivalry among Online
Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust Analysis, JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND
ECONOMICS (forthcoming). University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin
Research Paper No. 627 (2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2195340.
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type of analysis, is the decision by the High People's Court in China in
the matter of Qihoo v. Tencent. The Court in this matter concluded
that Tencent did not have a dominant position partly because it
competed against several other platforms that attracted traffic by
using different products and services and led to profits from the sale
of advertising and value-added services."
IV. INTERNET-BASED INDUSTRIES
A. The Development of Online Industries
The online industry has resulted from the evolution of two related
technologies, the World Wide Web and the development of mobile
telecommunications. The first, the Web, consists of pages that people
can see with a browser and accessed over the Internet. Internet-based
industries, however, now transcend products and services offered and
accessed through these pages only, as they increasingly include offline
products and services among their offerings, e.g. Amazon.com
competes with brick and mortar stores, Google Drive competes with
Microsoft's Windows/Office offerings; in fact there are traditional
appliances that are now controlled over the internet (thermostats,
washer and dryers).
Up until recently webpages were primarily accessed using
personal computers. This is no longer the case, which leads us to the
second major development of the World Wide Web: the development
of mobile communications. Most people in the world have a mobile
phone that they can use over domestic wireless networks. A steadily
increasing fraction of those users have "smart mobile devices" which
enable them to access the Internet. Those devices are computers with
operating systems that support mobile applications and browsers.
Both developments have spurred the creation of businesses, or
extensions of existing businesses, that rely on these online
technologies. These online businesses conduct many of their activities
"in the cloud"-collections of server computers that are accessed
through the Internet.
The development of the Internet has led to the creation of an
"online world" of commerce and community. The development of
smart mobile phones has resulted in the deep penetration of the
online world through the day and across physical location. The result
is that increasingly the Internet is always on, everywhere.
58 See David S. Evans, Vanessa Zhang, and Howard Chang, Analyzing Competition among
Internet Players: Qihoo v. Tencent, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (2013).
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Importantly, the development of smart mobile phones is spurring the
growth of online industries in developing and lesser-developed
economies because it lowers the cost of access significantly to a large
portion of people and businesses.
Today, and looking forward, the online and offline worlds are
merging. Internet connectivity over wireless is being integrated into
more devices such as point-of-sale devices for merchants, cars, and
televisions. Moreover, an increasing number of people carry during
their movement through the physical world smart mobile phones with
location-based technologies that enable Internet-connected
applications to know where users are. The result of this is that many
physical activities, including shopping, are integrating online aspects.
Despite the fact that the development of the commercial Internet
happened almost two decades ago there remains rapid growth and
innovation. In the United States, for example, which has one of the
most advanced online industries, online commerce still accounts for
only 5 percent of total commerce. There is a common misconception-
known as the "end of history illusion"-that we have seen all the
change there is and that the most recent revolution is the last, this
illusion recurs whenever we face a major technological change or
drastic innovation. It is useful to keep this illusion in mind in
considering market definition for the online world. Six years ago-but
more than a decade after the rise of the commercial Internet-smart
phones, social networking, and micro-blogging were insignificant
activities. Six years hence it would appear likely that there will be new
activities as disruptive as these.
Before we begin our analysis of competitive constraints for online
businesses it is useful to survey the current state of development of
these businesses in Latin America and the three countries that we are
focused on. Most Latin American countries have a vibrant Internet-
sector with many consumers engaging in online activities. As a general
matter e-commerce is not as highly developed in most Latin American
countries as it is in the US and most of the EU countries. Nevertheless,
there are certain similarities; about 25 percent of the time spent
online in the region involves using social networks compared with 29
percent in the US. Table 2 summarizes key aspects of Internet use in
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. We have also provided comparisons to
the US. Obviously, the use of the Internet in Latin America also shows
significant differences between major cities and outlying areas.
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Table 2: Summary of Internet Use in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
Key metric Argentina Brazil Mexico
Broadband 12.6% 6.4% 11%
penetration (% of
households)5
Average time 26.1 hours 27 hours 26.7 hours
using Internet per
month60
Percent of 24% 11% 14%
population that
uses the Interne'
Percent of people 24% 14% 20%
with smart
phones 62
While there are differences in infrastructure build-up (broadband
penetration) and even in device ownership (percent of people with
smart phones), it is interesting to note that the one variable where all
three countries have similar numbers is the average time they spend
each month using the Internet, regardless of the means by which they
are accessing it, which is roughly 26 hours. This reflects a fairly hard
constraint-all Internet-based firms must compete for a share of the
total amount of time users spend using the Internet. We call this
"competition for scarce attention" and discuss it in more detail
below. 63
59 Lucia Bibolini and Lawrence Baker, Latin American Broadband and Internet Market,
9th ed., available at http://www.budde.com.au/Research/2010-Latin-American-
Broadband-and-Internet-Market.html.
60 Comscore, available at http://www.comscore.com (last accessed Dec. 2011).
61 Comscore, available at http://www.comscore.com (last accessed June 2007).
62 Google and IpSOS, 2012, available at
http://www.rcrwireless.com/americas/20120522/devices/smartphone-penetration-24-in-
argentina-20-in-mexico-14-in-brazil.
63 The advent of smart mobile devices has increased the amount of time that consumers
realistically have available for Internet-based activities. They are still constrained by having
no more than 168 hours a week.
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B. Basic Economics of Online Industries
There are several aspects of online businesses that can affect the
competitive constraints that online businesses face.
1. Multi-Sided Platforms
Many online businesses are multi-sided platforms that serve as
intermediaries-or in some way connect-two or more distinct groups
of customers.64 The most common situation involves properties that
connect consumers with merchants. Some of these properties attract
consumers with content and then present advertisements that help
merchants obtain sales. Others provide online malls that create a
place for consumers to shop and merchants to sell online. Other
platforms attract users and support application developers. Many of
those application developers in turn connect consumers and
merchants. Like many multi-sided platforms, online platforms often
provide services to one side of the platform at no charge (the "subsidy
side") and make money from the other side (the "money side").
Multi-sided platforms often have indirect network effects. Users
on one side of the platform value having a larger number of users on
the other side of the platform. That creates a start-up problem because
platforms need to have a critical mass of customers on both sides to be
viable. An online mall is not valuable to shoppers unless there are
enough merchants, and is not valuable to merchants unless there are
enough shoppers. That also creates an engine for growth. Once a
platform reaches critical mass, more users on one side may entice
more users on the other side; these sorts of positive feedback effects
can fuel growth.
In the early days of the Internet, some commentators argued that
positive feedback effects would result in first-movers attaining
monopolies. In fact, as we will see below reality has been much more
complicated than that. Many investors who bet on the positive
feedback strategy as the road to monopoly and riches were wiped out
in the dot.com crash of 2001. As we will see below, churn has largely
characterized these industries, not just during a stock market crash,
and this includes those firms who arrived first to market and who
were regarded as unseatable.
64 See David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis ofMulti-Sided
Platform Businesse, OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, eds.
Roger Blair and Daniel Sokal (Oxford University Press, 2013). Also available in UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO INSTITUTE FOR LAW & ECONOMICS, Olin Research Paper No. 623 (forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2185373.
558 [Vol. 9:3
EVANS & MARISCAL
2. Technology
Online businesses rely almost entirely on software that runs in the
cloud. That software could be a sophisticated platform such as
Facebook, or it could be a simple web site designed to display content.
As a result, these businesses typically involve a fixed cost for
developing the software6 5 and a low marginal cost for people accessing
that software. This software can support third-party developers by
exposing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and providing
other services; that is, the software becomes a multi-sided software
platform.
The underlying software and IT technology for online businesses
has two implications. At least in terms of the physical infrastructure
for the business the cost of entry is relatively low. It is possible to start
and grow rapidly with a programmer and rented server space. It is
also relatively easy-since it involves writing code-to change and add
features to the products and services being offered. And once those
changes and features are added it is possible to make them available
to all customers instantly. Thus, online businesses are very different
from physical businesses and particularly manufacturing businesses.
3. Competition for Scarce Attention
Many online businesses seek the attention of consumers and then
make that attention available to advertisers, merchants, developers,
and others. That attention, however, is a scarce commodity. People
only have so much attention since they have to sleep, work, and do
various other things that cannot be done offline. This scarcity creates
intense competition among online businesses to get that attention. It
is the main driver behind innovation as businesses try to develop
something new to attract attention. Competition among these online
attention rivals is the principal focus of the remainder of this section
because they constitute the preponderance of online activity and
shape the dynamics of much online competition.
We focus on evidence from the United States in much of this
discussion since it is one of the more advanced online markets and
therefore provides a harbinger of developments for Latin America.
There is also systematic data over long periods of time available in the
65 The fixed cost could be endogenous in the sense that firms invest more in the asset in
anticipation of attracting more people.
66 See David S. Evans, Andrei Hagiu, and Richard Schmalensee, Invisible Engines: How
Sofhare Platforms Drive Innovation and Transform Industries (MIT Press, 2006).
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US to assess dynamic competition, which may not always be readily
available even for the largest or more advanced Latin American
economies, which we have studied here. Whenever possible, we will
provide similar information for Argentina, Brazil, and/or Mexico or
for the region as a whole.
C. Attention Rivalry
People only have so much time-precisely 168 hours a week. That
time gets parceled out to various activities involving work, leisure, and
sleep. Increases in activities that one can do online can draw time
away from other activities that comprise this fixed time constraint for
consumers. However, that substitution becomes harder to do since it
is difficult for consumers to curtail activities such as work, sleep, and
various leisure activities.
1. Evidence on Competition for Scarce Attention
In fact, in the United States the amount of time the average
Internet user spent online doubled between 2001 and 2010.67 But the
number of distinct web servers increased six fold in part because of
the entry of new web properties and the expansion of those properties.
The amount of content likely increased more than six fold since those
servers were able to handle an increasing amount of capacity as
memory prices declined. Therefore, the amount of online content
increased far more rapidly than the amount of attention available for
that content.
A study for the US conducted by Evans found that of the top
15,000 websites in September 2002, 12,775 (85 percent) had fewer
hours spent by visitors in September 2012 than in September 2002.68
Furthermore, 14,036 (94 percent) increased the total time spent by
less than the 373 percent increase in the overall time spent on
websites, and therefore had declining shares of attention. Even with
the total time spent by internet users on the web increasing by nearly
a factor of five over this period, the 85 percent of attention losing
67 David S. Evans, Attention Rivalry among Online Platforms and Its Implications for
Antitrust Analysis, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO INSTITUTE FOR LAw & ECONOMICS OLIN,
Research Paper No. 627 (2013) at 9-1o, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2195340 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.219534o. The total amount of time spent online increased
by 373 percent between September 2002 and September 2012. That figure includes both
the increase in the number of people online and the increase in the average amount of time
spent online.
68 Id.
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websites in the top 15,000 in September 2002, managed to lose a total
of 46o million of hours by September 2012. These 46o million hours
represent 30 percent of the total number of hours spent on all
websites in September 2002.
A further analysis suggested that, over the decade, consumers
shifted not just between websites in the same category, such as playing
games online, but between different categories. In particular the share
of the amount of time spent on portals (including search) declined
from 68 percent in 2002 to 28 percent in 2012 while the share of time
spent on social networking increased from 2 percent in 2002 to 29
percent in 2012.
There is one important point to note on the scarcity of attention.
The development of smart mobile phones resulted in a discrete jump
in the attention available for online activities. That is because people
can use mobile devices throughout the day and engage in multi-
tasking with them in ways that they could not do as conveniently with
computers. That jump occurred in the late 2000s as people started
acquiring the new iPhone and then Android-based phones. The trend
is continuing as more people acquire these and other smart mobile
phones and tablets.
2. Competition for Seeking Attention
Attention rivals see each other as competitors. As Yahoo!
observed, "[w]e also compete with social media and networking sites
which are attracting a substantial and increasing share of users and
users' online time, and may continue to attract an increasing share of
online advertising dollars."6 9 A review of financial filings by leading
web properties found that many of them identify other properties that
provide very different products and services as rivals." What these
properties all have in common is that they are seeking attention from
consumers and are trying to make money by selling that attention to
retailers or programmers.
In this part we examine the competitive constraints they impose
on each other for seeking attention and in the next for providing
attention.
69 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Yahoo Inc. Annual Fiscal Report
(Washington D.C. 2011) at 14, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/lonoo6/oooil9312513o85111/d 44 20 73 dlok.ht
m.
70 See Evans, Attention Rivalry.
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a. Scarcity ofAttention
Consumer attention is an input into selling advertising, sales
services, and other services. It is scarce because consumers have a
limited amount of time available and because a minute spent on one
website is a minute less available for another website. As with any
scarce input, firms must compete vigorously in order to attain it. The
pursuit of attention sets up the basic dynamic of much online
competition.
On this basis, competition occurs among very different offerings of
site content, such as: search sites, social networking, social media,
portals, auction sites, newspapers, entertainment, multimedia, games,
etc. In Table 3 we show the different types of competition that
websites competing for advertise are facing.
Table 3. Ranking of types of websites in the selected countries by Total
Minutes stayed at the site.71
Type of site Argentina Mexico Brazil
Social Media
Social Networking
Corporate Presence
)Entertainment
Services
Multimedia
News/Information
Portals
e-mail
L Promotional Servers
Games
Total
I Minutes
(MM)
8,006
Rank
by
Number
Total
Minutes,
(MM)
Total
Minutes
(MM)
1 10,203
7,852 2 9,960
3,702 3 7,405
2,823 4 5,580
2,727 5 4,547
1,911 6 4,283,
1,864 7 783
1,617 8 3,191
1,080 9 1,679
714 10 921
675 11 736
Rank
by
Number
Total
Minutes
2
3
4
5
6
Total
Minutes
M(MM)
52,863 1
49,386
23,128
17,000
18,665
9,641
11 3,225
7 27,073
8
10
12
6,700
5,454
4,202
71 Comscore, available at http://www.comscore.com (last accessed Apr. 2013).
Rank
by _
Number
Total
Minutes
(MM)
2
4
6
5
7
12
3
8
9
10
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General News 623 12 234 25 2,192 17
Newspapers 618 13 306 20 731 33
SeardhNavigation 523 14 936 9 3,525 11
XXX Adult 508 15 703 13 2,650 16
Online Gaming 502 16 487 16 3,086 14
Retail 422 17 489 15 3,136 13
Sports 421 18 292 22 1,802 20
Directories/Resources 323 19 568 14 1,704 22
Lifestyles 294 20 439 17 1,439 26
It is interesting to note that time spent is not overwhelmingly
concentrated in one or a couple of websites. If we estimate a
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) for these 20 attention grabbers in
Latin America (based on Argentina's top 20) the HHI's for Argentina,
Mexico, and Brazil are 1,220 1,198 and 1,308 respectively-figures that
denote relatively unconcentrated markets. Concentration is
overestimated with this measure as it excludes all other websites that
do not make the top 20-it assumes they have a zero share of the
market for consumers' web minutes.
b. Pricing for Securing Attention
Attention seekers typically do not charge consumers for visiting
their online properties and in fact entice them to come to their sites,
and spend time there, with valuable services. This practice is similar
to that of many multi-sided platforms that make access free, or indeed
subsidize, one group of consumers. They do that, as is the case with
attention seekers, in part because that group of consumers is highly
valuable to the other side. In the case of attention rivals, it is especially
not surprising that consumers get services for free given that there is
intense competition for scarce attention.
c. Feature Competition
Given a price of zero, attention seekers primarily compete for
attention by offering new attractive features. That constant feature
competition is particularly apparent to users of smart mobile devices.
Many times over the space of the year users are prompted to update
their applications often as a result of the addition of new features.
Feature competition is rapid and pervasive among attention seekers in
part because of how they attract new customers and keep existing
ones engaged. Consumers have come to expect that online businesses
will do this and that their online businesses must introduce new
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features regularly to remain competitive. Importantly, a website can
add a new feature and all of its users all around the world can
immediately have access to it.
d. Drastic Innovation
In addition to feature competition, there is "drastic innovation"
which creates completely new and highly trafficked categories.
Examples of these over the last decade include Facebook, Pinterest,
Twitter, Wikipedia, and YouTube. These websites brought new
products and services in the market previously not even in the
consumer's imagination.
e. Entry, Exit, and Churn
There is frequent entry by advertising-supported online attention
seekers. These range from small businesses such as blogs to ones that
become large quickly such as Twitter. As the study by Evans
documented for the US, each month, Compete.com reports the top
15,ooo websites by unique visitors. Out of the top 15,000 websites in
the January 2012 list, 3,954 (26 percent) were replaced by different
websites on the July 2012 list, just six months later.7 2 Many of these
new entrants quickly grew to a substantial size. The largest 100 of
them each had more than 150,ooo hours of time, which would have
placed them in the top sixth of the January 2012 liSt.7 3 Over a longer
time period, out of the 15,000 websites in the September 2002 list,
12,257 (82 percent) were replaced by different websites on the
September 2012 list, a full ten years later.7 4 As a consequence of this
growth, the number of very large websites is growing. Table 4 shows
the growth in the number of websites with more than one million
hours of attention per month.
72 Some of these new websites do not represent new businesses, but are rather new
websites for existing businesses.
73 Compete.com database, January 2012 and July 2012.
74 Compete.com, September 2002 to September 2012.
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Table 4: Growth in the Number of Websites Attracting Large Amounts
of Time Spent in the US-7
Number of Websites Exceeding Threshold
Threshold September 2002 September 2007 September
(Hours Per 2012
Month)
1,000,000 95 224 453
2,000,000 37 101 231
5,000,000 16 38 89
10,000,000 8 17 44
20,000,000 4 9 21
We see this churn in Latin America as well. Tables 5-7 show the
change in the rankings of websites between 2006 and 2013 measured
by number of visits, based on data from Alexa for our three study
countries. In each country many top websites fall out of the top
ranking and other websites increase or decrease their standing.
Table 5: Top 20 Websites Visited in Argentina in 2006 and 2013.
Web Site Rank 2006 Rank 2013
Google Argentina 1 2
Live.com 2 5
Fotolog.net 3
Youtube 4 3
Yahoo! 5 7
MSN 6 15
ElCiarin 7 12
MercadoLibre Argentina 8 6
Facebook 9 1
Taringa! 10 8
Google 11 4
Blogger.com 12 -
metroFLOG 13
76 www.alexa.com.
75 Compete.com, September 2002, September 2007, and September 2012.
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Web Site Rank 2006 Rank 2013
Rapidshare 14 -
Wikipedia 15 10
Poringa.net 16 -
Google Espafa 17
Microsoft.com 18
La Nacion 19 11
Sonico.com 20 -
Twitter.com 9
Infobae 13
Babylon -_14
Linkedin 16
Ole -17
Xvideos 18
Ask 19
Wordpress 20
Table 6: Top 20 Websites Visited in Brazil in 2006 and 2013.
Web Site Rank 2006 Rank 2013
Orkut Brasil 1
Google Brasil 2 2
Live.com 3 6
UOL 4 5
YouTube 5 4
Yahoo! 6 9
Globo.com 7 7
Google 8 3
Terra Brasil 9 12
MSN 10 16
Blogger 11 8
IG Noticias 12 14
MercadoLivre 13 10
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Web Site Rank 2006 Rank 2013
Rapidshare.com 14 -
Orkut 15 -
Wikipedia 16 11
4shared.con 17
Microsoft 18 -
Easyshare 19 -
Wordpress 20 20
Facebook 1
Twitter - 13
Babylon 15
Abril - 17
Banco Itau - 18
Linkedin - 19
Table 7: Top 20 Websites Visited in Mexico in 2006 and 2013.
Web Site Rank 2006 Rank 2013
Google Mexico I 2
Live.com 2 5
Youtube 3 3
metroFLOG 4 -
MSN 5 9
Yahoo! 6 6
Hi5 7 -
Google 8 4
Wikipedia 98
Mercadolibre 10 10
Blogger 11
RapidShare 12 -
MySpace 13
Facebook 14 1
Fotologenet 5
Microsoft 16 -
2014] 567
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Web Site Rank 2006 Rank 2013
Wordpress 17 15
Google Espafia 18 -
PhotoBucket 19
Sonico 20 -
Twitter 7
Babylon - 11
Amazon 12
Xvideos 13
Linkedin 14
El Universal 16
Taringa! - 17
Ask 18
Bing 19
Tumblr - 20
f. Number of Competitors
Thousands of firms compete for consumer attention in this way on
the Internet. Of the top 500 websites in the US as measured by time
spent, 135 primarily gather attention and sell it to advertisers, defined
narrowly. The HHI for these websites is 1345-a figure denoting a
relatively un-concentrated market-based on time on site and
assuming zero share for websites outside of the top 500; as a result of
the zero share assumption, this HHI is therefore overstated. The five
largest sellers of attention have 67 percent of the attention garnered
by these 135 websites. Defined slightly more broadly, 233 of the top
500 websites primarily gather attention and sell it to advertisers. The
HHI for these websites is lo88, again assuming a zero share for
77 Under the narrower definition, a website counts as an advertising-supported attention
seeker if 1) it is consumer-focused, and 2) its revenues come exclusively or almost
exclusively from banner ads, search ads, or flat listing fees for items for sale. Under the
broader definition, a website counts as an attention-seeker if 1) it is consumer focused, 2) it
earns substantial revenue from banner ads, search ads, fees for items for sales (whether flat
listing fees, commissions, revenue sharing, buyer fees, or sales lead fees), 3) its other
revenue comes from advertising-related sources, such as consumer research, marketing
campaign design, other marketing services, premium membership fees for consumers to
avoid ads and/or receive additional services, and credits for virtual goods.
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websites outside of the top 500. The five largest attention sellers have
60 percent of the attention garnered by these 233 websites. Attention
seeking is not a winner-take-all business.
3. Competition for Providing Attention
In this part we focus on attention rivals that earn revenue by
selling attention to advertisers. We comment on the relevance of this
to offline attention rivals that provide other commerce-related
services at the end of this section. Online attention rivals are similar to
traditional advertising-supported media platforms such as
newspapers, magazines, and television. They provide news and
entertainment to attract viewers and then sell display-advertising
spots on their pages. However, because they are software-based media
properties, these attention rivals can engage in highly targeted
advertising that is customized to the person viewing the
advertisement.
Online advertising-supported attention rivals sell many different
kinds of advertising. These include search-based, social media, and
display advertising. The advertisements themselves range from short
text ads to image-heavy display ads to video ads. Some, primarily
display ads, are sold based on the number of people who see the ads,
while others are sold based on whether individuals click on the ads.
Most online advertising is targeted based on information, or educated
guesses, about the person looking at the screen at a particular point in
time.
Advertisers buy online advertising because they want to sell
products and services to consumers-to obtain what are called
"conversions."7 8 They therefore make decisions on how much to spend
on advertising and how to allocate that spending across different
advertising channels-offline as well as online-by comparing the rate
of return on incremental investment across different channels.
Historically, advertisers have faced challenges in making these
decisions rigorously because of lack of data on the relationship
between advertising spending and conversions. They have had to
make them judgmentally based on a mixture of subjective and
objective information.
In recent years, however, advertisers have started using
sophisticated software-known as cross-channel attribution
technologies-for determining the marginal return on investment of
78 Conversions are defined as the proportion of visitors to a website who take action to go
beyond a casual content view or website visit as a result of subtle or direct request from
marketers, advertisers, and content creators.
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expenditures on different channels.79 These technologies collect data
on who has seen various ads, match that data to information on
whether there was a sale, assess the importance of different ads in
generating that sale and in some cases provide dynamic reallocations
of advertising budgets across sales channels based on results.so A
survey of 607 entities in late 2011 found that 77 percent of advertising
agencies and 62 percent of markets used these technologies." A study
of 53 marketers examined how they used cross-channel attribution
technologies.82 Virtually all of them used it to "measure the value and
performance of digital channels" (98 percent). Almost two thirds (64
percent) "use attribution to make improvements to in-flight or future
interactive marketing strategies like channel allocation and media
planning optimization." They used these attribution technologies to
examine many different channels. More than 70 percent of the
markets said they considered paid search, online display, natural
search, affiliate partners and email. More than a third also considered
Facebook posts, comparison shopping engines, Twitter, online video
ads, and the brand's own website.
The existence and widespread use of cross-channel marketing
technologies shows that advertisers (or advertising and marketing
firms which serve as their agents) see different online channels as
substitutes. Otherwise they would not be using products that facilitate
79 See Catherine Tucker, The Implications ofImproved Attribution and Measurability for
Online Advertising Markets?, (Competition Conference, University of Melbourne, Nov. 6,
2012), available at
http://ipria.org.au/events/conf/CompetitionConference/Measureabiltiy-and-online-ad
s.pdf.
so According to marketing material for Visual IQ's IQ Intelligence Suite, which is one of the
leading cross-channel attribution technologies, "Once your marketing performance data
and customer data (and any other data you wish to include) has been collected, formatted,
normalized and integrated during the software set-up process, IQ Insight presents it to you
through its powerful, yet easy to use dashboard and reporting interface. This allows you the
flexibility to view, report upon and compare the performance of every channel, campaign
and marketing tactic side by side, and to analyze that performance by any criteria specific
to your company, industry or business model. IQ Insight provides both executive overview
and granular views of your marketing ecosystem using a common set of your own key
performance indicators (KPIs)," available at http://www.visualiq.com/products/iq-
intelligence-suite (last accessed Nov. 2012).
81 Econsultancy (2012). The data were collected from September 26 through October 23,
2011. Of 607 respondents, 44 percent were located in North America and 33 percent were
in the United Kingdom.
82 Forrester Interactive Attribution (2012).
[Vol. 9:3570
2014] EVANS & MARISCAL 571
the comparison of their marginal returns on investment. The
availability and widespread use of these technologies also makes it
likely that these different channels have relatively high degrees of
substitution. Advertisers compare them using a single metric and can
make quick adjustments to their campaigns depending on the rates of
return, which depend on costs and results. In fact, the survey of 607
marketers and agencies in the US and UK discussed above found that
users of channel-attribution technologies changed their spending as
result of their use of these technologies. As shown in Figure 2,
responses from 179 of those surveyed shows that they appeared to
have substituted between both online media as well as between online
and offline media.
Figure 2: Substitution between Advertising Channels
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4. Product Differentiation and Attention Seeking
Attention rivals are obviously dramatically different from each
other. Twitter provides a very different service to viewers (micro-
blogging) than Yahoo! (content curation). Twitter also provides a very
different service to advertisers-tweets with short urls for links-than
Yahoo!-multi-color display ads. The point of this section, however, is
that those differences are not necessarily relevant for assessing
competition among online businesses. These attention rivals are all
competing aggressively with each other to secure attention. The
emergence of Twitter likely took viewers away from Yahoo!. And the
fact that services like Twitter can become quickly established and
grow explosively puts constant pressure on attention seekers. These
attention rivals then compete for advertisers to buy access to some of
that attention. But advertisers are constantly looking for ways to
reallocate their budgets among different channels to get what they
often really want-a sale. They do not necessarily care whether that
sale came from a tweet, a search, a social network ad, or a variety of
other media.
This section does not claim that attention rivals are necessarily all
in the same market. As usual with competition policy analysis we need
to consider the facts. Those facts may show product differentiation
among platforms softens competition enough to make the relevant
antitrust market narrower than "all attention rivals." But
differentiation is not functional equivalence, meaning that companies
ought to offer services with equivalent functions in order to be
considered competitors. Indeed, this is exactly the point we argue
against in section I of this paper. As our previous example of Yahoo!
and Twitter illustrates, the fact that ads in one firm are displayed and
look different than they do in the other, does not mean that the entry
of one rival into the market (Twitter) cannot divert marginal
consumers from one firm to the other-going back to our best
practices lexicon-and therefore can effectively constrain competition
for Yahoo!
In contrast, we could consider that there are enough facts to
determine that one attention rival does not share the same market as
another. There could be differences among the people providing
attention. An advertiser seeking to sell an expensive automobile is
interested in getting the attention of high-income people who are
likely in the market for buying a car. The attention of a teenage game
player is not a substitute. Hence the importance of garnering
information about customers by age and income group; for example,
in 2006, in Mexico 58% of internet users were between 12-24 years
old, 34% were between 25-44 years old, and 8% were more than 45
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years old; in 2010, 50% of internet users were between 12-24 years
old, 29% were between 25-44 years old, and i1% were more than 44
years old." There could also be differences in the manner in which
attention is generated which in turn reduces substitution possibilities.
The value of messages that are delivered on a search results page, as a
display advertisement on a web page, or as part of a web-based video
could differ. There are differences in the formats that are dictated in
part by the method of producing the attention. The context in which
the attention is generated could also lead to differences in the value of
attention to advertisers. Such product differentiation could result in
some attention seekers, or some segments of attention seekers, having
significant market power.84
There are several factors, however, that tend to reduce the
importance of differentiation for online platforms. Physical media
often have differentiated content because this tends to attract
particular types of consumers who are attractive to particular
advertisers, alternatively this type of media may also bundle content
in the hope of attracting a widest possible audience who will select the
content they find appealing. In the case of online media, software and
data-based targeting technologies can be used to identify particular
kinds of consumers without the need to bundle and differentiate their
content to a wide audience in order to engage the "right" audience.
They are therefore less reliant on content differentiation for targeting
83 Asociaci6n Mexicana de Televisi6n (AMIPCI), Hdbitos de los usuarios de Internet en
Mexico. May 17, 2011 and October 2007, 2011 version available at
http://www.slideshare.net/venturis/amipci-hbitos-de-los-usuarios-de-internet-en-mxico-
2011.
84 Different sources of attention may have different values to advertisers because of
differences in "how attentive" people are to advertisements on the property and the context
in which they are seeing the advertisements. These differences between source of attention
lead to differences in the likelihood that a view by a consumer will result in a
"conversion"-that is a sale of a good-for the merchant. However, these differences do not
necessarily lead to traditional product differentiation issues. For example, if property A
leads to 1o percent of the conversions per person viewing an advertisement as property B,
and that is the only difference, the price for showing an ad to a person on property B would
be lo percent of the price of the same advertisement on property A. At these prices the two
properties would be close substitutes. For example, it is much "cheaper" per click to buy
display ads on Facebook than to buy search ads on Google. But the Facebook ads result in
much fewer conversions per click than do the Google ads. See Larry Kim, Google Display
Network vs. Facebook Advertising, WORDSTREAM (2012), available at
http://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2o12/o5/15/ipo-facebook-vs-google-display-
advertising; see also, JCD Repair, Google Adwords vs. Facebook Ads - It Was No Contest,
(2012), available at http://www.jcdrepair.com/blog/google-adwords-vs-facebook-ads-it-
was-no-contest/645.
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the right people. It is also easier for online attention rivals to
reposition themselves in the event that there is a market opportunity
in another niche. They can add features, including content, to attract
particular consumers.
5. Extensions of Offline Attention Seekers
There are reasonable arguments for why different types of offline
attention seekers do not compete with each other. Consider offline
advertising-supported platforms. Historically advertisers did not have
good data for comparing the effectiveness of television, radio, and
print advertising. Their budgeting and allocation decisions were
therefore highly judgmental. These media were different from each
other and therefore arguably served different advertising purposes.
Entry and expansion was much harder than it is for online
advertising. It would also be hard to argue that advertising-supported
platforms were close substitutes for commerce platforms such as
shopping malls, if for no other reason than the time cost and
inconvenience of travel.
The emergence of online advertising and development of
sophisticated technologies has changed this in several ways. The fact
that it is possible to measure and determine incremental returns of
investment for online attention seeking places pressure to consider
the same issues for offline attention seeking. Knowing the return on
investment (ROI) for online display advertising encourages
advertisers to think through the likely ROI for offline advertising to
make budgeting decisions. In addition, the development of computer
technologies has made it increasingly possible to measure conversions
in physical advertising-such as using coupon codes in print
advertising.
As noted above, some of the cross-channel attribution
technologies compare online with offline advertising channels. Figure
2 showed that this comparison has encouraged substitution
particularly away from print and towards online. Goldfarb and Tucker
have also found evidence of substitution between online and offline
advertising." The online and offline worlds for commerce are
converging and this is likely to increase the degree of substitution. The
use of mobile devices is bringing the online world into physical spaces.
85 Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker, Substitution between Offline and Online
Advertising Markets (2010), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1721001.
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Advertisers and marketers are using increasingly mobile applications
to drive physical commerce.16
D. The Analysis of Market Definition and Market Power
This section has argued that "attention"-its acquisition and its
delivery-is the relevant dimension for analyzing the competitive
constraints these rivals impose on each other.' In practice, attention
rivals more frequently face significant competition from purveyors of
new products or services that could divert consumer attention from
them, than from the entry of close substitutes for their existing
products or services. Ostensibly different attention rivals often
substitute for each other from the standpoint of consumers and
merchants. Product differentiation tempers the significance of these
constraints. Product differentiation is relevant, however, when it
involves aspects of the attention that is procured and sold, rather than
particular features of the products and services used for acquiring and
delivering that attention to advertisers.
Antitrust analysis should therefore focus on competition for
securing and delivering attention in considering market definition,
market power, and competitive effects. Focusing on competition
between specific products and services, rather than attention, could
result in competition authorities and courts making either false-
negative or false-positive errors in their decisions. False-negative
errors could result from concluding that attention rivals do not
compete because they offer dissimilar products or services. False
positive errors could follow from ignoring competition among
attention rivals that offer different products and services. Analyzing
attention, which is the dimension on which these rivals compete in
fact, reduces the likelihood of these errors. The precise contours of
86 Chantal Tode, Macy's makes mobile integral part of Black Friday strategy to drive in-
store sales, Mobile Commerce Daily (2012), available at
http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/macy%E2%8o%99s-enhances-mobile-app-to-
facilitate-shopping-on-black-friday; Chantal Tode, Fairmont Hotels enhances foursquare
check-ins with location-based offers, Mobile Commerce Daily (2012), available at
http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/fairmont-hotels-enhances-foursquare-check-ins-
with-location-based-offers.
87 For the purposes of this Article, attention is the time that consumers spend focusing
their minds on content. Attention rivals provide products and services to buyers, such as
advertisers, who would like to get some of this attention. This attention is not necessarily
fungible. Depending on the circumstances in which it is provided advertisers might have a
chance of getting more attention or greater focused from consumers or might get attention
in a context that makes that attention more valuable because they have a greater chance of
persuading consumers to buy something.
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markets, market power, and impacts on competition will depend on
the particular circumstances of the subjects of the antitrust analysis,
the conduct under consideration, and the extent of differentiation
among relevant attention rivals.
There is no doubt that the Internet has resulted in the emergence
of large global firms that lead their categories. To take a few examples,
Facebook is clearly the leader in social networking, Google in search,
and Twitter in micro-blogging. However, as we have shown, several
factors need to be considered in evaluating whether these entities have
long-lived market power and whether product or services categories
correspond to relevant antitrust markets:
* The product or services categories morph
quickly and easily. Google has moved into social
networking, Facebook into search, and Apple
into advertising-supported media;
* There is rapid displacement of leaders both
overall and within categories. Facebook very
quickly displaced Google as the most trafficked
web property globally-it took a little longer,
however, to displace Brazil's social networking
site, Orkut-and Apple displaced Blackberry as
the software development platform for mobile
devices, with Google, through its Android
platform, now contending strongly for this
market; and
* The Internet-based industry is highly dynamic
with frequent drastic innovation, a feature that
is consistently mentioned in best practice
relevant market and market power
determination as difficult to analyze within a
traditional, hypothetical monopolist or
structuralist approach to do it right. Every time
we think the online industry has reached
maturity, disruptive innovation changes it all.
Attention rivals impose competitive constraints on each other
across boundaries defined by products and services they provide to
consumers and advertisers. It is an empirical matter whether these
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constraints are strong enough to place particular attention rivals in
the same relevant antitrust market and to significantly limit the
market power of particular platforms. This will ultimately depend, in
part, on the extent to which consumers and advertisers turn from one
attention seeker to another as prices, quality, and features change.
Some standard tools of competition analysis-diversion analysis and
econometric analysis of demand, adjusted for applicability to multi-
sided platforms-can help analysts obtain the evidence necessary for a
proper assessment. We offer here the example of relevant questions
that the European authority posed in reviewing the merger between
Skype and Microsoft. Our next section offers examples of how
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have posed similar such questions,
which follow the best practices we outlined, to reach an informed
conclusion on cases which unfortunately have not yet been about
Internet-based industries.
As we noted at the outset of this paper, what is important in
assessing market definition and market power is a careful analysis of
competitive constraints rather than formalistic methods that do not
correspond to economic realities. A good example of these principles
involves the EU's analysis of Microsoft's proposed acquisition of
Skype. 8 The European Commission's decision approving Microsoft's
acquisition of Skype echoes many of the themes we have discussed
above. Skype is an Internet-based company. It provides software that
enables people to communicate over the Internet through instant
messaging, voice calls, and video calls. Microsoft agreed to acquire
Skype in 2011 for $8.5 billion. Among other things Microsoft also has
an Internet-based communication service call "Windows Live
Messenger" (WLM). 89 The combination would result in Microsoft
having an 80-90 percent share of video calls in the European
Economic Area (EEA). Yet the European Commission considered the
possible effects of the merger and approved it without conditions.90
88 Although an example from one of the three Latin American countries we have presented
here would have been ideal, our research into the experiences of Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico in reviewing internet-based cases offered very little information about their
analysis. Nevertheless, we present a summary of this research in an Appendix to the paper.
89 Skype and Microsoft provide communication services to consumers and enterprises. For
the sake of brevity this section just considers the merger issues relevant for the consumer
services.
9o EC Microsoft Skype Decision, Case No. Comp/M.6281-Microsoft/Skype (2o11) at 20,
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_20111007-2o31o207
9398_EN.pdf.
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The Commission recognized the ease of entry into web-based
businesses and how quickly these new businesses could grow:
* "... the use of sites such as Facebook, Google+,
LinkedIn, and Twitter has more than doubled
since January 2009."
* "The Commission observes several recent
entries into the consumer communications
services markets. The example of Viber Media
... shows that it is possible even for a small
company to enter the market and attract a
significant number of users within a short
period of time."
* "The Commission notes that IM is a dynamic
market, as illustrated by the fast growth of
Facebook that has become the leader for IM in
less than three years with a market share of
approximately 50%."
" ... smaller players have succeeded in rapidly
entering, and gaining traction in the consumer
communications sector with innovative
products."
In addition, it noted that existing firms innovate and add new
features constantly.
* "The innovation cycles in these markets are
short. As a result, software and platforms are
constantly being redeveloped. Innovators
generally enjoy a short lead in the market."
This innovation is important because feature competition is
important.
* "Since consumer communications services are
mainly provided for free, consumers pay more
attention to other features. Quality is therefore
a significant parameter of competition."
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* "Consumers are very sensitive to innovative
services or products in consumer
communications services. Providers ... lose
traction quickly if they are unable to offer users
new and innovative functionality. For example,
Skype's innovations over the last eight years
highlight the critical role innovation plays in its
success...."
The Internet-based communication providers are also price takers.
* "These markets, and this is also true for video
calls, are currently free of charge. If a company
were to charge for its service, competitors
would switch to alternative providers offering
their service free of charge. This is confirmed by
internal documents of Skype showing that
[>75%] of its users would switch to an
alternative provider if Skype started charging
for its free service (in particular for video
calls)."
The Commission declined to define communication markets based
on functionality given the ease with which consumers could switch
between different services. And, while it also declined to define
specific markets, its decision to approve the merger is clearly based on
finding that ease of entry, feature competition, price-taking behavior,
and rapid innovation defeated the exercise of market power. Despite
finding that Microsoft would obtain a dominant position in video
calling it approved the acquisition without conditions. In doing so it
specifically relied on evidence that the providers are price-takers and
would lose customers if they did not compete on feature innovation.
V. TECHNICAL CAPACITY: ARE AUTHORITIES READY?
Throughout this paper we have underscored the need to look at
competitive constraints in assessing markets and power. We've
included some examples of key competitive factors, and have noted
that some of these are particularly relevant for internet-based
industries such as the possibility of using multiple devices to access
similar content-including mobile devices-(multihoming), the speed
of innovation, and the importance that seeking and providing
attention plays for firms in this market. The analysis of Internet-based
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industries has a degree of complexity that is not always present in
more traditional industries, which begs the question of whether Latin
American competition agencies are equipped to undertake them.
In this section we use non-Internet cases reviewed or investigated
by each of the three authorities to illustrate how they have in fact
undertaken complex analyses and have used the best practices in
market definition and power that we've outlined. We also include as a
general reference, a compendium of historical cases that do involve
Internet-based industries. To date, none of the Internet cases have
used the complex analysis to which we have referred to before.
A. Competitive Constraints Analysis in Practice: Selected Case
Studies
1. Argentina
In December 2004, Telef6nica M6viles S.A. announced the
acquisition of the assets of BellSouth Corporation. In Argentina,
Grupo Telef6nica was one of the two main suppliers of fixed telephony
services, and one of the four main suppliers of mobile telephony
services. BellSouth, also one of the four main suppliers of mobile
telephony services, had minor market shares in other
telecommunications activities including data transmission, Internet,
cable television, and long distance fixed telephony. At the time, the
CNDC identified seven markets where both companies were active
and evaluated the likely effects of the merger over the competitive
dynamics of the market, as well as potential vertical effects derived
from the concentration.9'
Although a traditional market share analysis was undertaken
considering participation prior to and following the merger, the
authority observed that between 20ol and 2004, the market shares of
the participants had varied. Hence, it considered that the intensity of
the competition in the market was high, given the volatility of the
market shares. Furthermore, it reasoned that competitors would be in
a position to respond to any potential increases in price from the
merged company, as they possessed enough spectrum to increase
their service offerings and offset any exercise of market power by the
merged company. Lastly, the Commission considered that although
spectrum accumulation by itself can determine competitive conditions
in the telecommunication industry, accumulation can also lead to
efficiencies in the market due to reductions in marginal and total cost.
91 National Commission for Defense of Competition (CNDC), Dictimen 196/2004, Grupo
Telef6nica and BellSouth Corporation (2004).
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2. Brazil
The operation involved an agreement between Nestl6 and Garoto
Brasil in which Nestl6 would acquire new stocks issued by Garoto.
Considering the market of chocolates as a whole, Nestl6 was the
leading company, alternating the first place with Kraft Foods (Lacta),
with Garoto as the third largest firm. Nestl6's average market share
between 1998 and 2001 was of 34.5%, while Garoto's was 23%.92
The merging parties and Kraft filed dueling market definition
studies, employing price elasticity models to estimate consumer
reactions to relative prices among different chocolate formats and
chocolate brands. Because results were dramatically different CADE
was forced to consider a host of methodology issues associated with
simulation models, including identification of the relevant demand
function, assessment of the statistical uncertainty associated with
demand elasticity estimates, and examination of the potential defects
in the differentiated products models that the simulations employed.
Other hotly contested issues included barriers to entry and the
prospects for expansion of such rival brands as Mars and Hershey.
The Council studied the minimum efficient scale required to enter the
market, the time required for entry to be effective, minimum
investments required to enter and selling possibilities. CADE
concluded it was unlikely that Kraft would make investments
necessary to offset market power. This conclusion together with the
difficulty of entry into the market led CADE to conclude that the
probabilities that the merged firm would abuse its market power was
high.
3. Mexico
The case involved a renewed complaint by Pepsi Bottling Group
against Coca-Cola for exclusive dealings in the small retail shop
distribution outlet, which comprised 70% of all sales in the industry
and involved more than 1 million points of sale nationwide. This
conduct was foreclosing the market for Pepsi's own carbonated
beverages.9 3
93 Case number DE-013-2008 (appeal RA-037-2012), available at
http://resoluciones.cfe.gob.mx/ (last accessed June 2012).
92 Ato de Concentraglo 08012.oo1697/2002-89. Oficio SDE/GAB 050/2002. Nestl6 Brasil
LTDA. e Chocolates Garoto S.A. (2002), available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?el42c252a3798dadb8.
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The Federal Competition Commission (CFC) constructed a three-
step structured rule of reason test to determine potential harm arising
from the conduct. It considered that there was a high probability of
harm if any of the following three conditions existed (a) if, under
normal conditions, an entrant that is as efficient as a standard
industry measure of efficiency cannot enter (does not reach a
Minimum Efficient Scale or MES); or (b) if the conduct is prevalent-
that is sufficiently widespread-such that it prevents industry
participants from attaining "normal" levels of efficiency; and/or (c) if
the conduct determines the incumbent's ability to maintain or
increase its dominance.
The authority found that Pepsi was able to attain a MES and in
some cases, was in fact operating in the decreasing returns to scale
portion of its costs. Through a survey of depositions by store keepers
offered as evidence by the complainant, it found the conduct was
relatively infrequent (less than 4% of the small shops confirmed the
exclusivity agreements) and had a short duration (less than 1 year).
Finally, the CFC found that consumers have access to other products
in the distribution channel; that there was a competitive dynamic in
the market (entry, exit, innovation-new drinks, etc.); and that Coca-
Cola's market power arose mostly from the value of its brand and the
efficiency with which it operates its distribution network. The case was
closed and the decision withstood an appeal before the Commission.
As evidenced by the three cases presented here, authorities have
focused on competitive dynamics and non-price information when
determining ex ante harm to competition (mergers) as well as ex post
anticompetitive conduct (investigations). The case in Argentina
illustrates how the CNDC recognized that shares were not a useful
metric of market power when these are volatile and there are other
dimensions for rivals to compete aggressively (e.g. spectrum). Brazil's
case highlights the importance of evaluating diverse evidence to reach
a determination, and to review evidence based on accepted economic
methodologies that CADE determined in this case. It also illustrates
the importance of including estimates of minimum efficient scale
(MES) of entry when reviewing barriers to entry. MES played an
important role in the decision by the Mexican authority also, as it
determined whether foreclosure was indeed possible as an effect of
exclusive deals. The Mexican case shows how market power should
not focus solely on the level of market shares held by the defendant
but on whether its conduct increases this level and causes harm.
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B. Internet Analyses in Practice: Case Studies
In order to give a broad perspective of the types of cases that the
authorities have reviewed and the degree of complexity and depth that
has so far been required in analyzing them, we present a selection of
cases-the majority of them-that the CNDC, CADE, and the CFC have
reviewed over a period of time that spans 2000 through 2009. The
fast pace of change in the industry is not only evident in the cases, but
also in the agencies' decisions. In addition, since 2000-the first
internet-based case we have on record-there have been important
changes in the technical know-how and expertise within the agencies
themselves, as they have garnered knowledge and experience, and
have sought training for their employees. The cases are grouped into
three different types of analyses. For example, a number of
transactions involved vertical integration between Internet access
providers and online content producers; others involved horizontal
acquisitions either in the jurisdictions themselves or elsewhere but
with effects in Latin American countries; some of these involved
online businesses, others mergers of online and offline businesses. In
each case, authorities seemed to be posing traditional questions to
analyze a new industry. For vertical mergers, the acquisition of a
website by an access provider focuses on an essential facility-type of
query; for horizontal mergers, concerns seem more focused on
whether content offerings or services are sufficiently similar to be
considered substitutes or if these operations appear to be analogous to
a company acquiring a portfolio of content. 94
It is evident from the resolutions of the three authorities we
included here, however, that they have been careful in not
constraining themselves to set relevant market definitions or to strict
methodologies for market power determination. It is particularly
interesting to note the evolving description of Microsoft's business
over the course of time as the Brazilian authorities analyzed the
different merger deals, from a very generally defined market in 2001-
software development-to a broader conception of its business that
goes beyond the IT industry: programming and correlated services for
any customers involving online, business, and peripherals including
entertainment. Yahoo! also conceives of its business as having a wider
94 It is unfortunate, however, that the level of detail in the analysis of these cases is scant in
the case of Argentina and most notably in Mexico. Nevertheless, to the extent that we can
present their decisions as a reference of what the agency considered the relevant markets
to be and whether market power existed in this industry, we've included the authorities'
determinations here.
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reach than just search capabilities or advertising revenues. Its
business is no longer restricted to Internet, but includes features we
associate with telecommunications and broadcasting markets, such as
email, messaging, video streaming, and music. It is also interesting to
highlight how Argentina's advertising market analysis tends to include
all broadcasting distribution outlets: printed, video, streaming and
internet media. In the case of Mexico, the information included in its
case summaries points to a wide conception of the product market,
again underscoring care in not overly constraining case law to
narrowly defined markets in a rapidly changing industry.
1. Offline and Online Mergers
a. AOL/Time Warner-Argentina
In 2000, Argentina's CNDC analyzed the effects in its territory of
the merger between America Online and Time Warner." The analysis
does not suggest recognition that this was a two-sided market where
market share analysis could provide little insight into market power; it
also ignored any indirect externalities between each side of the
respective offline and online content providers. Instead the agency's
focus was on identifying overlaps between the two companies
considering each side of the market as distinct. Thus, distribution of
online and offline content was analyzed in two distinct channels: TV
and Internet, finding no competition concerns. The CNDC also
analyzed the other side of the market as a separate advertising market.
This broad product dimension, led to a conclusions that the effects of
the merger were very small as most advertising revenues did not come
from pay TV or internet and were distributed as follows: coming from
free to air TV (close to 40%), newspapers (23%), pay TV (12%), and
internet advertising at o.1%.
b. Microsoft/aQuantive-Brazil
In 2007, Microsoft sought to acquire aQuantive.9 6 aQuantive
participated in the advertising sector through 3 business divisions:
technology for digital publicity, digital communication performance,
95 CNDC, Dictamen 144, America Online Inc. and Time Warner Inc. (Oct. 24, 2000),
available at http://www.cndc.gov.ar/dictamenes/39_I-ooo144.pdf.
96 Department of Justice, Secretary of Economic Law, Ato de Concentragao
08012.008554/2007-11, Microsoft Corporation and aQuantive Inc. (2007), available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/plenario/Sessao_404/Pareceres/ParecerProcade ACo8012.0O
8554-2007-11_ool.pdf.
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and digital marketing. Microsoft described its business as creation,
development, and provision of computer software and related
services. Brazil's SDE considered that there was no horizontal overlap
between the different companies, but noted that 90% of aQuantive's
revenues came from Microsoft, so that the transaction had a vertical
component. It consequently looked at the market offering online
advertising services and found that there were a large number of
competitors worldwide and therefore no evidence of upstream closure.
The operation was approved.
c. Microsoft/Fast Search-Brazil
In 2008 Microsoft purchased all shares for Fast Search & Transfer
ASA, 97 a Norwegian firm that developed and marketed software for
corporate search. Microsoft described its business to the Brazilian
authorities as a firm that participated in the market for operating
systems, computer software and production of video, videogames,
computer games, and other peripherals, as well as corporate search.
The latter was the only market subject to analysis by SDE. SDE did not
undertake a complete relevant market definition analysis as it
considered that there were a large number of participants in the
market, that Fast and Microsoft's participation was modest and that
each party's service offerings were complementary. In addition, clients
stated no opposition to the deal.
d. Microsoft/Yahoo!-Brazil
In 2009, Microsoft and Yahoo! decided on an exclusive licensing
agreement for 10 years whereby Microsoft would grant Yahoo!
technology to undertake algorithmic and sponsored searches.9 8
Following the 1o year period, the license would continue but with no
exclusivity. Microsoft also agreed to offer advertising text services to
Yahoo! and Yahoo! would become the sole worldwide representative
of both companies in their sales relationship with premium
advertisers. The agreement excluded web products, email services,
instant messaging, graphic publicity, or other businesses. Microsoft's
97 Department of Justice, Secretary of Economic Law, Ato de Concentraqao
o8012.OOO710/20o8-78, Microsoft Corporation and Fast Search & Transfer Asa. (2oo8),
available at http://www.cade.gov.br/temp/tl1o02o131o13648.pdf.
98 Department of Justice, Secretary of Economic Law, Ato de Concentragao
o8o12.oo6419/2009-94, Minist~rio Da Justiga. Secretaria de Direito Econ6mico.
Microsoft Corporation y Yahoo! Inc. (Aug. 24 2009), available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/temp/tloo2o131oo13966.pdf.
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programming and correlated services were described as including 5
segments: clients; suppliers and tools; online services; Microsoft
business division; and accessories and entertainment division.
Yahoo!'s services were divided into 6 categories: "Front Door" services
(free to users and financed through advertisements); communities
services; search services, also financed through advertising revenues;
communication services; advertising and premium services, including
TV and music services; and applications to access internet. Brazil's
SDE defined online markets following previous jurisprudence, as
global with an open geographic reach. SDE concluded that the deal
would allow the parties to better compete with Google globally, and
would improve advertising competition, benefiting those seeking to
advertise, consumers, and improve websites.
e. Yahoo!-Brazil
There are two operations involving Yahoo! that the Brazilian
competition agencies reviewed. The first in 2002 involved the
acquisition of Starmedia,9 9 and was reviewed by all three Brazilian
competition agencies. The second, involved the 2003 acquisition of
Inktomi,oo was also reviewed by the three agencies. In the first case
Starmedia operated a Brazilian search engine named "Cade?" that
edited and catalogued Brazilian websites. Both companies obtained
revenues through advertising sales. Even though the advertising
market could include TV, radio, printed media, and internet, CADE
decided to take a narrow view of the market as internet advertising in
Brazil, reasoning that it was a small but growing industry and data
could not yet be secured to allow for a substitution analysis between
"virtual" publicity and publicity in more traditional media outlets.
Nevertheless, the transaction represented too small a market share to
require further scrutiny. In the proposed acquisition of Inktomi
Corporation by Yahoo! the authorities determined the relevant market
to be internet search, where Yahoo! did not participate but purchased
search technology from Google, who did compete with Yahoo! in
offering website services. Although the authorities did foresee future
vertical relations among the parties, they did not consider this to be a
concern. In the case of the Brazilian authorities' analysis of Yahoo!'s
99 Department of Justice, Administrative Council for Economic Defense, Ato de
Concentragao o8o12.ooo182/2002-61, Yahoo! Do Brasil Internet y Starmedia do Brasil
Ltda.
100 Department of Justice, Secretary of Economic Law, Ato de Concentraqao
08012.OOO212/2003-11 Yahoo! Inc. y Inktomi Corporation (Jan. 14, 2003).
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acquisition of Starmedia as early as 2003, the small size of this market
and lack of data to allow for a more in depth analysis of substitution
among different advertising media outlets, led the authority to only
make general statements about possible elements that would
differentiate internet based advertising from other types of
advertising. Here, CADE took the view of deciding on a narrowly
defined market for Internet advertising, and noted only differences in
what it called directed advertising, publicity where the consumer
takes an active role in searching for a product or service, in contrast
with creative advertising, where a message reaches a consumer with
the intent of persuading him or her about the qualities of certain
products or services and conquering him or her for a client or
advertiser. It noted that Internet advertising could include either one
of these types of publicity.
2. Online Content Mergers
a. BtoB Factory/btoben.com Inc.-Argentina
For very early cases (c. 2000) there is a tendency to separate
markets based on functional interchangeability. For example,
Argentina's analysis of the merger between BtoB Factory and
btoben.com Inc. in 2001,101 delved into the types of internet portals
involved in the operation, noting that there were 3 distinguishable
segments: business to consumers (B2C), business to business (B2B),
and consumer to consumer (C2C). Based on this separation, the
CNDC noted that there was no overlap between the business served by
BtoB factory, the B2C segment, and that served by btoben.com Inc.,
the B2B segment. According to CNDC, since the focus of the analysis
was on type of content provided by each party, the universe of existing
and potential Internet content providers was sufficiently vast and
barriers sufficiently low so as to deem any one company incapable of
exercising significant influence.
b. Google Brasil/Akwan-Brazil
Brazil's SEAE reviewed the acquisition of Akwan by Google
Brasil in 2005.102 Both companies were regarded as having a similar
1o CNDC, Dictamen 197, B to B Factory Ventures S.A. y Consalvi International Inc. (Jan. 25
2001).
102 Department of Finance, Secretary for Economic Monitoring, Ato de Concentragao
o8o12.oo6162/2005-47, Google Brasil Internet Ltda. y Akwan S.A. (Aug. 26 2005),
available at http://www.abusando.org/denuncias/akwan-cade-googlel.pdf.
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line of business: search for final consumers with revenues generated
mainly through the sale of Internet advertising space. But the line of
business was not translated into one two-sided market, but instead
SEAE defined the relevant markets under review as (1) Internet search
technology, (2) Internet advertising space, and (3) corporate search,
which was an additional service offered by Akwan and not by Google.
As was the case of Argentina before, two-sided markets were defined
as two one-sided markets, and even within those services, there were
further narrow classifications: in Internet search technology, the
authority distinguished between search firms that offered their own
searching capabilities and those that searched linking to other search
engines. SEAE ultimately approved the transaction.
3. Vertical Mergers: Internet Access and Online Content
a. Terra Networks/Infosel-Mexico
There were three operations reviewed by Mexico's competition
authority involving access providers and content producers, we look at
the two that have more information on the analysis.o3 The first, in
1999, where Terra Networks Mexico, a Spanish holding, purchased
Infosel, a Mexican society offering media and news content through
TV, telephony, messaging, internet, cable, electronic and telegraphic
media. According to the CFC, Terra and Infosel coincided in the
following relevant markets: financial information (content), financial
electronic commerce, business to business, corporate services
(internet service provision and solutions) and consumer services
(internet service provision and websites). That same year, Via Net,
which marketed Internet access services and other value added
services (electronic data exchange, email, remote access to data
bases), entered the Mexican market through the acquisition of
Infoacces. Via Net, who offered Internet access services, installation
and administration of networks and was authorized to offer value
added services in various cities in Mexico. In both cases the
Commission seems to have taken a mechanistic view of the markets it
was reviewing: the type of content involved in the operation was
103 CNT-138-1999 (Terra Networks M6xico, SA de CV / Informaci6n Selectiva, SA de CV /
Infoshare Communications, Inc / Interdata Infosel, SA de CV / Seguridad Privada, SA de
CV), (October 4, 1999), available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/docs/pdf/cnt-138-99.pdf;
CNT-139-1999 (Via Net Works, Inc / Infoaccess, SA de CV), (Nov. 15, 1999), available at
http://www.cfc.gob.mx/IMAGES/STORIES/PUBLICACIONES/GACETAS/o5SEPTIEMB
REDICIEMBRE1999/G5-2CONCENTRACIONES.PDF; CNT-41-2004 (Flux International /
MVS Net / Clearwire Corporation), (May 19, 2004), available at
http://www.cfc.gob.mx/docs/pdf/cnt-41-2004.htm.pdf.
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noted, as was the service for each type of consumer (corporate or final
consumers). However, true to its legal underpinnings, the CFC's
analyses really focused on the effects: in both cases, the operation
involved a new entrant, market definition was simply accessory to the
final decision which focused on new entry, which is always good for
competition, and hence received the Commission's approval.
b. Terra Networks/Lycos Inc.-Mexico
The 2000 merger between Terra Networks and Lycos Inc., which
originated in the US was analyzed in Argentina as a vertical merger,
that of an Internet access provider (Terra Networks, owned by
Telef6nica) and an online content provider, Lycos.10 4 Since the parties
also coincided in online content provision, the market was also
analyzed. As was the case of the AOL/Time Warner merger, two one-
sided markets were reviewed instead of one two-sided market. On the
content production side, the CNDC argued that the parties coincided
in search and content generation, with Lycos being a fairly new
entrant. On the selling side of the platform, treated as an independent
market from content production, an analysis similar to the AOL/Time
Warner merger was undertaken.
c. Google/Motorola-Mexico
In 2011, the CFC reviewed the acquisition by Google of the
Mexican subsidiaries of Motorola.'os Google's business included
search and online advertising, as well as an open architecture
operating system for mobile devices, Android. Motorola, marketed
hardware (mobile devices and set-top boxes or STBs) in two business
segments: mobile devices including smartphones and tablets, and
home appliances including broadband access solutions. The
Commission concluded that there were no horizontal overlaps
between the parties, but a vertical relationship. Again, following its
law in determining whether the merger had or could have as object or
effect harm or hindrance to the competition process, it concluded that
Google had no incentives to refuse or condition the sale of Android as
a result of its acquisition of Motorola. Furthermore, it reasoned, there
104 CNDC, Dictamen 153, Terra Networks y Lycos Virginia (Nov. 17 2000), available at
http://www.cndc.gov.ar/dictamenes/39-1_ooo153.pdf.
105 Federal Competition Comission, Expediente No. CNT 090-2011, Google Inc. and
Motorola Mobility Holding (Dec. 8 2011), available at
http://www.cfc.gob.mx/cfcresoluciones/docs/concentraciones/V414/1/1613669.pdf.
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were important competitors, including Nokia, Samsung, and LG. This
led to an unconditional approval of the merger.'o
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In Latin America, modern antitrust institutions have emerged as a
result of a changing perspective on the role that government should
play in the economy. Public policy no longer considers the State as a
key driver of economic growth; rather, modern antitrust policy in
many of these countries regards markets as key to growth, so that
interventions by an agency are usually limited to ensuring that firms
follow a competitive process. As part of the efforts to "catch up" with
more mature agencies, antitrust authorities in the region have made
conscious efforts to "spell out" and follow best practices, particularly
through guidelines. The implementation of best practices can be seen
in certain antitrust analyses of Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.
We presented three examples of casework, not necessarily related
to internet-based industries, where these competition agencies have
undertaken a market definition and power analysis that follows best
practices. But some questions remain:
* Will agencies be able to apply these same
concepts as they face mergers and
investigations into "new economy" industries?
They certainly do have the technical capabilities
to do so.
* Will they have an awareness of the ways in
which these practices ought to be reviewed in
light of the special features that characterize
these industries? We've presented
considerations that must make up any
competition analysis into this industry when
reviewing competition matters, to ensure that
their fast pace of change, multi-sided
characteristics and attention seeking rivalry
form part of any relevant market and power
analysis.
1o6 Google/Motorola was also reviewed and approved by CADE. It is currently under review
in Argentina by the CNDC.
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As one of us has argued in a previous paper, attention seeking by
online rivals means that in many instances competition is not
occurring "for the market" but "in the market" and this is an empirical
question that authorities need to address. Analyses based on
functional equivalence among services are wrong as attention rivals
impose competitive constraints on each other across boundaries
defined by the products and services they provide to consumers and
advertisers.
Finally, while this degree of detail in the analyses of cases
involving Internet-based industries have not yet been used by the
competition agencies we study here, it is very likely that cases will be
brought before these authorities soon. It is only a matter of time
before we hopefully see a decision that provides in-depth analytical
considerations about market definition and power concepts in a highly
dynamic, multi-sided industry. At least that would be our wish.

